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Logical ﬁltering is the process of updating a belief state (set of possible world states) after
a sequence of executed actions and perceived observations. In general, it is intractable in
dynamic domains that include many objects and relationships. Still, potential applications
for such domains (e.g., semantic web, autonomous agents, and partial-knowledge games)
encourage research beyond intractability results.
In this paper we present polynomial-time algorithms for ﬁltering belief states that are
encoded as First-Order Logic (FOL) formulas. Our algorithms are exact in many cases of
interest. They accept belief states in FOL without functions, permitting arbitrary arity for
predicates, inﬁnite universes of elements, and equality. They enable natural representation
with explicit references to unidentiﬁed objects and partially known relationships, still
maintaining tractable computation. Previous results focus on more general cases that are
intractable or permit only imprecise ﬁltering. Our algorithms guarantee that belief-state
representation remains compact for STRIPS actions (among others) with unbounded-size
domains. This guarantees tractable exact ﬁltering indeﬁnitely for those domains. The rest
of our results apply to expressive modeling languages, such as partial databases and belief
revision in FOL.
© 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Many everyday scenarios are dynamic and partially observable: a robot in one room cannot see the state of another
room, a camera overlooking a bookshelf cannot detect the title of a book that is obscured, and one cannot readily observe
the amount of money an agent has. Many applications in such domains compute information about the current world state
(belief state, i.e. set of possible states or a distribution over such a set) after performing actions and perceiving observations.
This computation is called ﬁltering (also, state estimation, belief update, and database progression). They use this information
to make decisions (e.g., “increase the asking price for my car”), answer questions (e.g., “where is my calculus book?”), and
explore (e.g., “go to room 2 and sense the state of the circuit break”).
Filtering is intractable in general for discrete domains [17], and much research is dedicated to its approximation in
stochastic domains (e.g., [6,15,20]). Still, these approximations introduce unbounded errors many times, take unbounded
computation time in others, and are not usable in most deterministic domains.
Recent progress on logical methods for ﬁltering of propositional belief states (sets of states) [3] with actions and obser-
vations has shown that exact ﬁltering is tractable when belief states are represented as propositional formulas, and certain
natural assumptions are met. Still, many domains have propositional encodings that are too large. In some domains, propo-
sitional representation is not possible at all. This includes domains with large numbers of objects, unknown numbers of
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Deduction ﬁlter (Section 3.2) none unbounded (lazy computation) unbounded
Factored ﬁlter (Section 4) 1:1 actions; Finite FOL ﬁltering of atoms;
precompilation stage
precompilation unbounded; O (|ϕ| · C) O (|ϕ| · C), C depends on pre-
compilation
Unit-case ﬁlter (Section 5.1) 1:1 Unit-Cases actions; UNAa O (Rl(l+ |ϕ| + p)) O (Rl(l+ |ϕ| + p))
STRIPS ﬁlter (Section 5.2) STRIPS actions; known success; UNA; ϕ in
clausal formb; cases fully instantiated
O ((l|ψ |)2e) O ((l|ψ |)2e);
STRIPS ﬁlter (Section 5.2) STRIPS actions; known success; UNA; ϕ in
2-clausalc form
O (m2(R + n)2R ) O (m2(R + n)2R ) for any t > 0
time steps
Legend: ϕ: input (initial) belief state; m: number of predicate symbols; R: maximum arity of predicates; n: number of constant symbols (not objects, which
may be inﬁnitely many); l: total number of cases for action a’s successor-state axioms; p: number of distinct atoms in the precondition of a; e: number of
distinct affected literals of a.
a UNA: Unique-Names Assumption.
b Clausal form: Conjunction of disjunctions in ∃∗∀∗ fragment of FOL.
c 2-clausal: Every clause has  2 literals.
Fig. 1. The algorithms presented in this paper, their properties, and their assumptions for correct ﬁltering. All algorithms assume no function symbols. No
algorithm assumes a ﬁnite domain or requires a closed-world assumption (CWA). (The CWA is made in many planning domains. It assumes that the only
objects in the domain are those mentioned explicitly.)
objects, and observations with partial knowledge about identity of objects. Propositional methods are very ineﬃcient in
such domains, and representations are typically large and cumbersome.
In this paper we present tractable algorithms and theoretical results for ﬁltering belief states that are represented in First-
Order Logic (FOL). These representations permit belief states of inﬁnite sizes, uncertainty about the number of objects and
their identity, and observations that do not distinguish between some objects. It also enables more compact representations
than those of propositional logic.
More speciﬁcally (detailed results table is presented in Fig. 1), we present the following algorithms and complexity
bounds on their performance: First, we show that when actions are partial functions that map states 1:1, we can ﬁlter
arbitrary FOL belief-state formulas in time O (|ψ | · C), for ψ the input belief state representation, after a precompilation
stage of the domain (not including ψ ). The output size is O (|ψ | · C), for C a constant (possibly large) that depends on our
actions’ deﬁnitions (not on the input sequence of actions or the initial belief state).
Second, we examine in more detail two action representations that permit faster and more compact ﬁltering without
precompilation of the domain. Both of those classes of domains represent the effects of actions by cases.
For the ﬁrst class of actions we show that ﬁltering takes time O (Rl · (|ψ | + l + p)) for R the arity of predicate ﬂuents, l
the total number of cases into which ﬁltered actions break, and p the number of distinct atoms appearing in preconditions
of the action and in cases. The belief state returned has representation size O (Rl · (|ψ | + l + p)). To obtain these results we
assume that actions are 1:1 and can be broken into cases conditioned on unit clauses (this is deﬁned formally in Section 5.1),
and that different constant symbols refer to different elements in our domain (this is the Unique Names Assumption (UNA)).
We present a different result for the second class of action representations, namely, STRIPS actions [18] in two different
scenarios. In the ﬁrst scenario we assume that every action case for a but one instantiates all variables in every affected
predicate (thus making it a proposition). Also, we assume the UNA and that actions are executable when they are ﬁltered.
Given those, we show that ﬁltering takes time O ((l|ψ |)2e) per action, for e the number of affected literals for action a. Also,
we show that the resulting belief state formula is represented in space bounded by O ((l|ψ |)2e) (here, |ψ | is the size of the
input belief state).
Focusing on ﬁltering sequences of length T > 0, and assuming input belief states that have only clauses of  2 literals, we
get a ﬁnal, better result. Assuming UNA and STRIPS actions, not assuming full-instantiation of cases (cases may instantiate
subsets of variables), we show that the same algorithm for STRIPS actions takes time O (m2(R + n)2R) per action, for m
predicates of arity at most R and n constant symbols. The output belief-state space representation is bounded by O (m2(R +
n)2R) regardless of the number of ﬁltering steps. Thus, ﬁltering a sequence of t > 0 actions and observations takes time
(tm2(R + n)2R).
Notice that the domain may still be large (or inﬁnite) when R,m,n are small, so this result enables tractable ﬁltering
for some very large domains. This result guarantees tractable ﬁltering for arbitrary sequence lengths with such domains. It
applies to standard STRIPS actions, among others.
These results support a growing belief that FOL can be used eﬃciently for representing and updating partial knowledge
[40,66,53,41,65].
En route to these contributions we relate deterministic Situation Calculus [53] with a FOL transition model [4]. In the
transition model, every belief state is a set of FOL structures over the FOL language of a state. We encode this set of
structures with FOL formulas. We re-state results of [40,64] showing that ﬁltering such belief states can be captured exactly
by deduction in FOL and that deduction can be carried out one time step at a time, if all we wish is to answer queries about
a particular future or past state.
This forms the foundations for the rest of our results, which give an eﬃcient (polynomial-time) exact algorithm for
computing this deduction, under some common conditions as mentioned above.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the semantics that we use for FOL ﬁltering. In Section 3
we provide a naive algorithm for ﬁltering and prove its correctness. Section 4 offers a polynomial time algorithm for FOL
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properties of ﬁltering FOL KBs over logical connectives that we prove in the same section. Section 5 presents eﬃcient
algorithms for our two kinds of case-based actions.
Some of the results of this paper appeared previously in [56]. In particular, some of the basic algorithms of Sections 4
and 5 appear there. The complexity results, correctness, and examples are new to this manuscript, and so is the perspective
relating this work to early and recent research on progression of FOL databases.
2. Semantics of ﬁrst-order ﬁltering
In this section, we study logical ﬁltering with FOL structures. Logical ﬁltering is the process of updating a set of possible
world states after a sequence of executed actions and perceived observations. In this paper, a world state is represented by
a FOL structure. Before explaining the details of logical ﬁltering semantics, we present the languages that we consider.
2.1. First-order languages
A ﬁrst-order language is speciﬁed by two sets of symbols:
(1) Logical symbols:
(a) Logical connectives: ∧,∨,¬, . . . .
(b) Quantiﬁers: ∀,∃.
(c) Equality: =.
(2) Nonlogical symbols:
(a) Variables (inﬁnitely many): x, y, z, . . . .
(b) Function symbols: For each n, a set of symbols called n-ary function symbols. A 0-ary function symbol is called
constant. We use strings of English characters starting with capital letters for constants.
(c) Predicate symbols: For each n, a set of symbols called n-ary predicate symbols.
Note that the equality symbol can be treated as a binary predicate symbol. We deﬁne the terms and formulas by the
following generalized inductive deﬁnition. Variables and functions are terms. Predicates are atomic formulas. We deﬁne
literals to be atomic formulas or the negation of atomic formulas. Concepts of free and bound occurrences of a variable in a
formula are deﬁned as usual. A closed formula is a formula with no free variable.
A FOL language is a language in which the symbols and formulas are as described above. It is completely determined by
its nonlogical symbols. We now turn to a description of the semantics of FOL languages. A structure S for a FOL language
consists of:
(1) |S|, the nonempty universe or domain of the structure S . The elements of |S| are called the individuals of S .
(2) For each n-ary predicate symbol p, pS ⊆ |S|n . These tuples of the universe are those tuples on which p is true in the
structure.
(3) For each n-ary function symbol f , f S : |S|n → |S|. (In particular, for each constant e, eS is an individual of S .)
When a sentence ψ is true in a structure S , we denote it by |	S ψ . To deﬁne it, we need a more general notion of truth for
a formula. Suppose that:
(1) φ is a formula of a given FOL language.
(2) S is a structure for the language.
(3) σ : V → |S| is a function, called a variable assignment, from the set V of variables of the language into the universe
of S .
We can now deﬁne |	S φ[σ ], meaning that the formula φ is true in the structure S when its free variables are given the
values speciﬁed by σ in the universe of S as follows.
(1) Terms: Deﬁne an extension σ ′ of the function σ from the set of all terms of the language into the universe.
(a) For each variable v , σ ′(v) = σ(v).
(b) If t1, . . . , tn are terms and f is an n-ary function symbol, then
σ ′
(
f (t1, . . . , tn)
)= f S(σ ′(t1), . . . , σ ′(tn))
(2) Atomic formulas:
(a) For term t1 and t2,
|	S t1 = t2[σ ] iff σ ′(t1) = σ ′(t2)
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|	S p(t1, . . . , tn)[σ ] iff
〈
σ ′(t1), . . . , σ ′(tn)
〉 ∈ pS
(3) Well-formed formulas:
(a) |	S ¬φ[σ ] iff not |	S φ[σ ].
(b) |	S (φ ⇒ ϕ)[σ ] iff |	S ¬φ[σ ] or |	S ϕ[σ ].
(c) |	S (∀x)φ[σ ] iff for every d ∈ |S|, |	S φ[σ(x/d)]. σ(x/d) is the function that is exactly like σ except that for the
variable x it assigns the value d.
Deﬁnition 1. The language of a set of formulas D, L(D), is a set of ﬁrst-order formulas whose predicate and function symbols
appear in of D.
As an example, suppose that in structure S:
• |S| = {B, R},
• for binary predicate in: inS = {〈B, R〉},
• for constant Oﬃce: OﬃceS = {R},
• for constant C++: C++S = {B}.
This world has the predicate in that indicates whether a book is in a room or not, the book C++ and the room Oﬃce. By
this deﬁnition, sentence in(C++,Oﬃce) is true in S .
We deﬁne logical ﬁltering using situation calculus [44] in a way compatible with basic action theories of [53]. In the
following section we discuss the basics of situation calculus needed for our work.
2.2. Situation calculus
In this section, we specify the language and axiomatization of situation calculus that we will use throughout the paper.
The situation calculus is a language for specifying properties of actions. The formal language adopted here is a second-order
language with equality. It has three disjoint sorts: action for actions, situation for situations, and object for everything else
depending on the domain of the application. This language has the following alphabet (this deﬁnition is similar to the
situation calculus of Reiter [53]):
• A constant symbol S0, denoting the initial situation.
• A binary function symbol do : action × situation → situation. The intended interpretation is that situations are ﬁnite
sequences of actions, and do(a, s) denotes that sequence formed by adding action a to the sequence s.
• A binary predicate symbol Poss : action× situation. The intended interpretation of Poss(a, s) is to show the possibility of
performing the action a in situation s.
• A binary predicate symbol  : situation× situation deﬁning an ordering relation on situations. The intended interpreta-
tion of situations is as action histories, in which case s s′ means that s is a proper subhistory of s′ .
We want to be able to say that a certain sequence of actions is a subsequence of another. To formalize this, we adopt
the following four foundational axioms presented in [33]:
(1) do(a1, s1) = do(a2, s2) ⇒ a1 = a2 ∧ s1 = s2,
(2) (∀P ).P (S0)∧ (∀a, s)[P (s) ⇒ P (do(a, s))] ⇒ (∀s)P (s),
(3) ¬s S0,
(4) s do(a, s′) ≡ s  s′ .
Axiom 1 is a unique-names axiom for situations, stating that two situations are the same iff they are the same sequence
of actions. Axiom 2 is the second-order induction on situations. The importance of induction for the situation calculus is
described by Reiter in [52]. This axiom is the only second-order axiom in our action theory. However, Reiter in [33] showed
that the second-order axiom is not needed for projection purposes. In the rest of this paper, we use the ﬁrst-order situation
calculus without this axiom. This subset of the situation calculus is suﬃcient for ﬁltering, as shown by Reiter.
The above axioms are domain independent. We refer to them as Σ . Combination of these axioms with a speciﬁcation of
axioms holding for the initial situation, successor state axioms, action precondition axioms, and unique-names axioms for
actions is called a basic theory of actions.
Generally speaking, the truth value of a predicate and the value of a function in a dynamic world may vary from time
to time. In FOL there is no intrinsic notion of time. Hence, situation calculus includes relational and functional ﬂuents
that capture the dynamic behavior of our world. Predicates whose truth values vary from situation to situation are called
relational ﬂuents. They are denoted by predicate symbols taking a situation term as their last argument. Functional ﬂuents
are deﬁned similarly.
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ﬂuents. Thus, predicates whose truth values do not change from situation to situation are handled with axioms that enforce
these constraints.
Deﬁnition 2 (Uniform formulas). Let s be a term of sort situation. Inductive deﬁnition of a term uniform in s is as follows:
(1) Any term that does not mention a term of sort situation is uniform in s.
(2) If f is an n-ary functional ﬂuent other than do, and t1, . . . , tn are terms that are uniform in s, then f (t1, . . . , tn, s) is
uniform in s.
The formulas that are uniform in s are inductively deﬁned by:
(1) Any formula that does not mention a term of sort situation is uniform in s.
(2) If p is an n-ary relational ﬂuent other than Poss, and t1, . . . , tn are terms that are uniform in s, then p(t1, . . . , tn, s) is a
formula uniform in s.
(3) If ϕ1 and ϕ2 are formulas uniform in s, so are ¬ϕ1, ϕ1∧ϕ2 and ∃v ϕ1 provided that v is a variable not of sort situation.
Thus, a formula is uniform in s iff it does not mention Poss, it does not quantify over variables of sort situation, it does
not mention equality of situations, and whenever it mentions a term of sort situation in the situation argument position of
a ﬂuent, then that term is s.
We deﬁne precondition axioms and successor state axioms as a part of our basic action theory as follows.
From this point on, in our formulas the letter a refers to a ground action, and the letter A refers to the corresponding
action symbol, i.e. A is a function symbol that has arguments of sort object and value of sort action.
Deﬁnition 3 (Action precondition axioms). An action precondition axiom is a sentence of the form:
Poss
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
) ⇔ precondA(x1, . . . , xn, s)
where A is an n-ary action symbol, and precondA(x1, . . . , xn, s) is a formula that is uniform in s and whose free variables
are among x1, . . . , xn, s.
Deﬁnition 4 (Successor state axioms). A Successor state axiom is deﬁned for either a relational ﬂuent or a functional ﬂuent.
A successor state axiom for an n-ary relational ﬂuent p is a sentence of the form:
Poss
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
) ⇒ ∀y1, . . . ,∀ym(
p
(
y1, . . . , ym,do
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
)) ⇔ succp,A(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, s))
where A is an action symbol, and succp,A(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, s) is a formula that is uniform in s, and whose free variables
are among x1, . . . , xn , y1, . . . , ym, s. We deﬁne a successor state axiom for a functional ﬂuent similarly as follows.
Poss
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
) ⇒ ∀y1, . . . ,∀ym,∀z(
f
(
y1, . . . , ym,do
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
))= z ⇔ succ f ,A(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, z, s))
The basic action theory has the form D = Σ ∪ Dss ∪ Dap ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 where:
• Σ are the foundational axioms for situations.
• Dss is a set of successor state axioms.
• Dap is a set of action precondition axioms.
• Duna is a set of unique-names axioms for actions. A(x) = A′(y), A(x) = A(y) ⇒ x = y where A and A′ are action
symbols.
• DS0 (the initial database) is a ﬁnite set of FOL sentences that are uniform in S0. DS0 will function as the initial theory
of the world (i.e., the one we start off with, before any action is executed).
All changes to the world are the result of named actions. An action may be parameterized. For example, move(B, R1, R2)
stands for the action of moving object B from room R1 to room R2. We use the situation calculus as foundations and
semantics. Later (Section 3 onwards) we focus more closely on belief states, and situation calculus is used in the proofs of
theorems.
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Consider a book-keeper robot which lives in a world consisting of rooms. When the robot is in a room, it can make
observations about the books in that room. It can move a book from one room to the other, it can return a book to the
library from an arbitrary room or it can put a borrowed book in a room. So possible actions are move(b, r1, r2), return(b, r)
and borrow(b, r). The actions which are executable in a world state can change the value of different relational or functional
ﬂuents. Relational ﬂuents are room(r, s), book(b, s), and in(b, r, s). There are no functional ﬂuents except constants.
We deﬁne the precondition axiom and the successor state axiom for action move and omit the others.
• Precondition Axiom:
Poss(move(b, r1, r2), s) ⇔ book(b, s)∧ room(r1, s)∧ room(r2, s)∧ in(b, r1, s)∧ r1 = r2.
• Successor State Axiom:
Poss
(
move(b, r1, r2), s
) ⇒ ∀b′∀r′ (in(b′, r′,do(move(b, r1, r2), s))
⇔ (((b′ = b)∧ (r′ = r1)) ⇒ FALSE∧ ((b′ = b)∧ (r′ = r2)) ⇒ TRUE
∧ (¬((b′ = b)∧ (r′ = r1))∧ ¬((b′ = b)∧ (r′ = r2))) ⇒ in(b′, r′, s)))
We write this successor-state axiom in this way to help usage in Section 5. Indeed, the successor-state axiom can be
simpliﬁed logically.
2.3. Filtering semantics
For ﬁltering we are interested in answering queries over values of ﬂuents after actions and observations occur from
time 0. Stated in the language of situation calculus, we are concerned with queries uniform in s, for some ground situation
term s.
Thus, in our ﬁltering language there is a predicate corresponding to each relational ﬂuent of our situation calculus
language. Those predicates do not take any arguments of sort situation. Roughly speaking, the truth value of a predicate
changes from one situation to another. We represent predicates re-using the same symbols of relational ﬂuents but with
different arity (one less than the corresponding relational ﬂuent).
Thus, in the following deﬁnition we drop all situation terms. The values of all predicates and functions are considered
in the same situation. Transition from situation s to do(a, s) (performing action a) changes the values of predicates and
functions.
The following is a formal deﬁnition of transition relations and ﬁltering over FOL structures. The generality of the system
demands attention to speciﬁc details regarding cardinality of sets and the relationship between FOL formulas and the classes
of structures characterized by these formulas. We bring those details ﬁrst.
Let κ be a ﬁxed inﬁnite cardinality κ  ℵ0 (we keep this cardinality unspeciﬁed to emphasize the generality of the
following development). The vocabulary for describing a state of our system is 〈P,F ,C〉, with P a set of predicate symbols,
F a set of function symbols, and C a set of constant symbols. Let S be the set of all FOL structures S over 〈P,F ,C〉 that
have cardinality ‖S‖ at most κ . Progression and ﬁltering semantics are as follows.
Deﬁnition 5 (Transition relation for FOL structures). For an action theory D, a structure S , and a ground action a, we deﬁne a
transition relation RD as follows.
RD =
{〈
S,a, S ′
〉 ∣∣ |	S preconda, S, S ′ ∈ S and |S| = |S ′|
pS
′ = {〈v1, . . . , vm〉 ∈ |S|m ∣∣ |	S succp,a(v1, . . . , vm)},
f S
′ = {〈v1, . . . , vm, vm+1〉 ∈ |S|m+1 ∣∣ |	S succ f ,a(v1, . . . , vm, vm+1)}}
In this deﬁnition vi is an individual of |S|.
Note that action a is a parameterized action. The parameters are constants (e.g., move(C++,Oﬃce, Lounge)). For a =
A(u1, . . . ,un), preconda is equal to precondA(u1, . . . ,un) which is deﬁned by the precondition axiom of the action symbol A.
Now, we deﬁne ﬁltering semantics using transition relation for FOL structures.
Deﬁnition 6 (First-order logical ﬁltering semantics). Let  be a set of FOL structures. The ﬁltering of a sequence of actions and
observations 〈a1,o1, . . . ,at ,ot〉 is deﬁned as follows (	 refers to the empty sequence).
(1) Filter[	]() = ;
(2) Filter[a]() = {S ′ | S ∈ , 〈S,a, S ′〉 ∈ RD};
(3) Filter[o]() = {S ∈  | |	S o};
(4) Filter[〈ai,oi, . . . ,at ,ot〉]() = Filter[〈ai+1,oi+1, . . . ,at ,ot〉](Filter[oi](Filter[ai]())).
We call Step (2) progression with a and Step (3) ﬁltering with o.
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ulary 〈P,F ,C〉, with P,F ,C the predicate, function, and constant symbols that correspond to relational ﬂuents, functional
ﬂuents, and constants (essentially, they are the same only without a situation argument). For example, the predicate in(b, r)
corresponds to relational ﬂuent in(b, r, s) in the situation calculus.
Every belief state formula ψ has a corresponding belief state, σψ = {S ∈ S | |	S ψ}. In the opposite direction, every
belief state σ has many belief state formulas to which it corresponds, and we distinguish one such formula, the theory of
σ . The theory of σ , Th(σ ), is the set of all ﬁrst-order sentences with vocabulary 〈P,F ,C〉 that all structures in σ satisfy.
Th(σ ) = {φ | φ in vocabulary 〈P,F ,C〉, ∀S ∈ σ |	S φ}.
Several delicate points are worth mentioning. First, our choice of κ affects S and the rest of the sets discussed
above. Nonetheless, taking σψ with κ ′ > κ does not change Th(σψ). Speciﬁcally, Th(σ κψ ) = Th(σ κ
′
ψ ). This results from the
Lowenheim–Skolem theorem. Thus, our choice of κ is not important as long as it is at least countable (ℵ0) and is at least
as large as the number of symbols in the vocabulary (when the vocabulary is inﬁnitely large).
3. Filtering of FOL formulas
Approaches to ﬁltering actions and observations that at any stage enumerate all the structures in a belief state are
impractical because almost all belief states are of inﬁnite sizes. Even when those are ﬁnite, an enumeration approach does
not scale to large domains. An alternative approach is to perform logical progression in a form similar to the one described
by [40,46]. In our work now we wish to do so eﬃciently in the context of nondeterministic actions and observations.
In this section we present a naive algorithm that ﬁlters belief state formulas directly. This algorithm serves as a starting
point for Sections 4 and 5, where we propose eﬃcient algorithms. We also present distribution properties of ﬁltering over
the logical connectives ∧,∨,¬, and examine the theoretical limitations of formula ﬁltering. These will guide us in Section 5,
and allow us to present classes of systems that are not subject to those limitations and can be tracked in polynomial time
(with a compact representation) indeﬁnitely.
From here forth we assume that our ﬁrst-order language has no functional symbols except constants. This assumption
help present our results more concisely, and is does not restrict the applicability of our results.
3.1. Filtering as consequence ﬁnding
In this section we show how to progress an initial database represented by a logical formula after applying a single
action or observation. The result of progression is a new database that the progression algorithm can use afterwards.
Suppose that P = {g1, . . . , gr} is the set of all constants and predicates of our ﬁrst-order language. We deﬁne a new
set of symbols P ′ = {g′1, . . . , g′r}. We view P as the set of constants and predicates in situation s, and P ′ as the set of
constants and predicates in situation do(a, s). Thus, g′i(y1, . . . , yn) = gi(y1, . . . , yn)[P/P ′] where [P/P ′] is a shorthand for[g1/g′1, . . . , gr/g′r].
We ﬁlter a belief-state formula as follows. (We reuse the notation Filter[·](·) for ﬁltering a belief-state formula and also a
set of formulas.) Let ψ be a belief state formula (a formula that represent all the possible structures of the current state of
the world), a be a ground action, Cn(Ψ ) be the set of FOL consequences of Ψ (i.e., formulas φ in FOL such that Ψ |	 φ), and
CnL(Ψ ) be the set of logical consequences of Ψ in the language L. We write CnL(Ψ ), when L is a set of symbols to mean
CnL(L)(Ψ ).
1. Filter[a](ψ) =
(
CnP
′
(
ψ ∧ preconda ∧
∧
i
∀y1, . . . , ym, p′i(y1, . . . , ym) ⇔ succpi ,a(y1, . . . , ym)∧
∧
i
∀z, f ′i = z ⇔ succ fi ,a(z)
))
[P ′/P]
2. Filter[o](ψ) = ψ ∧ o (1)
When we ﬁlter with action a we assert that its precondition held in the last world state. If the action is not executable
on the belief state, the new belief state formula would be FALSE which indicates an empty set of structures (meaning that
there is no structure of the current belief state in which the action was executable). We also deﬁne ﬁltering of a set of
formulas enabling a recursive use of the previous equations. For a set of formulas Γ ,
1. Filter[a](Γ ) =
(
CnP
′
(
Γ ∪ {preconda} ∪
⋃{∀y1, . . . , ym, p′i(y1, . . . , ym) ⇔ succpi ,a(y1, . . . , ym)}∪
i
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i
{∀z, f ′i = z ⇔ succ fi ,a(z)}
))
[P ′/P]
2. Filter[o](Γ ) = Γ ∪ {o} (2)
We prove in the following theorem that this deﬁnition of ﬁltering approximates the semantics of Deﬁnition 6.
Theorem 7. Let ψ be a belief state formula, and let a be a ground action, then
Filter[a]({S | |	S ψ})⊆ {S ′ ∣∣ |	S ′ Filter[a](ψ)}
Proof. See Appendix A.1. 
[40] showed that progression is not always ﬁrst-order deﬁnable. They showed that progression always exists as a set of
second-order sentences for ﬁnite initial databases. Therefore, the two sides of Theorem 7 are not equivalent since formula (1)
is in FOL. In other words, FOL is not strong enough to model the progression of the initial database. However, the following
corollary shows that the two sides of Theorem 7 would be equal if the progression of a database is FOL deﬁnable.
Corollary 8. Let ψ be a ﬁrst-order belief state formula. If progression of ψ is ﬁrst-order deﬁnable then
Filter[a]({S | |	S ψ})= {S ′ ∣∣ |	S ′ Filter[a](ψ)}
Proof. See Appendix A.2. 
3.2. Deduction-based algorithm for ﬁltering
Our baseline algorithm computes Filter[〈a1,o1, . . . ,at,ot〉](ψ) by iteratively applying ﬁltering of a belief-state formula
with an action and an observation. It is not too practical, and is presented here for reference and contrast with later meth-
ods. Since every step may generate an inﬁnite set of sentences, we reformulate this intuition into the following algorithm.
(1) Set ψ0 = ψ , and ψi = oi for all 0< i  t .
(2) Concurrently for all 0< i  t do
(a) Apply a ﬁrst-order consequence ﬁnder (e.g., resolution [32]) to generate sentences in Filter[ai](ψi−1) using for-
mula (1).
(b) When a sentence is generated, add it to ψi .
This algorithm is correct for ﬁltering, as shown below. We discuss methods for consequence ﬁnding that can be used
here further in Section 4.2.2. In Sections 4, 5 we provide algorithms for generating the formula that is the result of ﬁltering.
3.3. Sequences of actions and observations
This section shows that iterative application of formula-ﬁltering steps loses no information with respect to answering
queries about the outcome of a sequence of actions and observations. It shows that we can discard the previous database
after ﬁltering every action and start using the database that we obtain after performing the progression step for that action.
To show so we use the ﬁrst-order situation calculus that we described above. It follows the treatment of situation calculus
by Reiter [53].
The development in this section can be seen to follow immediately from the following more general results by [40,64].
Theorem 9. (See [40, Prop. 4.10].) Let φ(s) be a formula uniform in s, and let a = 〈a1, . . . ,at〉 be a sequence of ground action terms
(do(a, s) is a shorthand for do(at ,do(at−1,do(. . . ,do(a1, s), . . .)))). Then, for DSα the second-order ﬁltering to Sα and FSα the ﬁrst-
order ﬁltering to Sα ,
(D − DS0)∪ DSα |	 Sα  do(a, Sα)∧ φ(do(a, Sα))
iff
(D − DS0)∪ FSα |	 Sα  do(a, Sα)∧ φ(do(a, Sα))
We bring a more complete development below to help explain the foundations of our algorithm in Section 3.2 and our
results that follow in Sections 4 and 5.
We divide our action theory D into two parts, the initial database DS0 and the rest Dg . Therefore, D = Dg ∪ DS0 . We
deﬁne the language of an action theory as follows.
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Suppose that we want to progress our initial database DS0 with action a1. Recall that D = Σ ∪ Dss ∪ Dap ∪ Duna ∪ DS0 .
To progress D with action a1, not all the axioms are required [33]. Instead of including all successor state and precondition
axioms in the action theory, we just need precondition and successor state axioms related to action a1 (with the same
action symbol). To retrieve these axioms, in all the successor state and precondition axioms with the same action symbol
as a1 we replace their parameters with the constants appearing in ground action a1. We refer to this subset of successor
state axioms as Dss0,1 . The subset of precondition axioms corresponding to action a1 is Dap0,1 . For example, if our ﬁrst
action is move(C++, Lounge,Oﬃce), then axiom
Poss
(
move(x1, x2, x3), s
) ⇒ ∀y1, . . . ,∀ym(
p
(
y1, . . . , ym,do
(
move(x1, x2, x3), s
)) ⇔ succp,move(x1, x2, x3, y1, . . . , ym, s))
would be replaced by
Poss
(
move(C++, Lounge,Oﬃce), S0
) ⇒ ∀y1, . . . ,∀ym(
p
(
y1, . . . , ym,do(a1, S0)
) ⇔ succp,move(C++, Lounge,Oﬃce, y1, . . . , ym, S0))
All other axioms are not needed for progression with a1. For a ground action term a1 we are looking for a set of sen-
tences D1 uniform in do(a1, S0) that can serve as a new initial database.
Deﬁne Ds1 as the ﬁrst-order progression of DS0 with a, the set of sentences uniform in do(a1, S0) that are entailed by D.
If we show that Dg ∪Ds1 |	 ψ iff D |	 ψ for every ﬁrst-order sentence ψ uniform in a situation s′ such that do(a1, S0)  s′ ,
then Ds1 can be used as a new initial database for further ﬁltering. The following theorem states this result for two-step
progression.
Theorem 10. (Similar to [40, Prop. 4.10].) Let DS0 be an initial database for an action theory D (D = Dg ∪ DS0 ). Deﬁne Dst for t  1
as follows:
Dst = Cnst (Dsst−1,t ∪ Dapt−1,t ∪ Dst−1)
Then, for all ψ uniform in do(at ,do(at−1, . . . ,do(a1, S0))),
Dg ∪ Dst |	 ψ iff Dg ∪ DS0 |	 ψ
Proof. See Appendix A.4. 
Theorem 10 is a different derivation of Lin and Reiters’ result that applies to ﬁltering. [40] Proposition 4.10 showed that
ﬁrst-order progression is enough for consequences about any speciﬁc future ground situation term. Filtering is interested in
answering queries about given ground situation terms, so this theorem implies that ﬁrst-order progression answers ﬁltering
queries correctly.
For example, in our book-keeper example if
DS0 =
{
book(B, S0), room(R, S0), in(B, R, S0)
}
and the ﬁrst action is return(B, R), then Ds1 is logically equivalent to
{
book
(
B,do(a1, S0)
)
, room
(
R,do(a1, S0)
)
,¬in(B, R,do(a1, S0))}
4. Factored ﬁltering
In this section we present one of two main contributions of this paper, namely, a polynomial-time algorithm that com-
putes logical ﬁltering exactly for a signiﬁcant class of transition systems. For the systems that do not fall within this class
our algorithm gives an approximation to the ﬁltering.
Our algorithm in the next section decompose ﬁltering of FOL formulas to the ﬁltering atomic subformulas. Recall that
a FOL formula is atomic (an atom), if it is a predicate (or =) applied to well-founded terms, i.e. it includes no quantiﬁers
or connectives. In what follows we prove several decomposition properties of ﬁltering of FOL formulas. Our algorithm uses
those properties and ﬁlters subformulas of a formula later combining the results.
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Several distribution properties hold for logical ﬁltering. We can decompose the ﬁltering of a formula ϕ along logical
connectives ∧,∨,¬,∀,∃.
Theorem 11. Let a be an action, and ϕ and ψ be FOL formulas. Assume that ﬁltering of a is deﬁnable in FOL. Then,
(1) Filter[a](ϕ ∨ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ)∨ Filter[a](ψ),
(2) |	 Filter[a](ϕ ∧ψ) ⇒ Filter[a](ϕ)∧ Filter[a](ψ),
(3) |	 Filter[a](¬ϕ) ⇐ ¬Filter[a](ϕ)∧ Filter[a](TRUE),
(4) Filter[a](∃xϕ(x)) ≡ ∃xFilter[a](ϕ(X))[X/x] .
(X is a new constant symbol.)
Proof. See Appendix A.6. 
Thus, ﬁltering ϕ ∨ ψ with a can be done by ﬁltering ϕ and ψ separately and then combining the results. Also, ﬁltering
ϕ ∧ ψ can be approximated by ﬁltering ϕ and ψ separately and then combining the results. The formula that is the
conjunction of the ﬁltering of ϕ and ψ separately is a logically weaker formula than the ﬁltering of ϕ ∧ψ . Thus, everything
that is entailed by that combination is also true in every structure of the original ﬁltering.
Filtering of ¬ϕ can be approximated in the other direction. The formula that is the negation of the ﬁltering of ϕ is a
stronger formula than the ﬁltering of ¬ϕ . Thus, everything that follows from the ﬁltering of ¬ϕ necessarily holds in the
negation of the ﬁltering of ϕ and that of TRUE. Also ﬁltering ∃xϕ(x) can be done by ﬁltering ϕ(X) with X being a new
constant symbol and then replacing every X in the resulted formula with variable x and having an existential quantiﬁer
over x.
While 2 and 3 are only approximations (according to Theorem 11), they can be used as an exact answer in some
domains. Our following Theorem 13 gives a stronger statement for actions that act as 1:1 partial functions on the structures
in which they are executable.
Deﬁnition 12 (1:1 actions). Action a is 1:1 if for every structure S ′ there is at most one S such that RD(S,a, S ′).
Recall the example from Section 2.2.1. There, action a =move(C++,Oﬃce, Lounge) is a one-to-one mapping between FOL
structures. Assume that we deﬁne another action moveto(C++, Lounge) which moves book C++ to room Lounge regardless
of where the book is before moving. This new action is not 1:1 because it maps different FOL structures to the same one:
e.g. it maps structures whose book C++ locations are different and otherwise are identical to the same structure.
In many domains an action which is not one-to-one such as moveto can be replaced easily with a 1:1 action such as
move with no loss in the expressivity of the domain (e.g. turning on the light can be replaced by ﬂipping the light switch).
Domains that only include 1:1 actions are called 1:1 domains. The next theorem presents distribution-over-connectives
properties for 1:1 domains.
Theorem 13 (Distribution properties for 1:1 domains). Let a be a 1:1 action, and ϕ and ψ be formulas. Assume that ﬁltering of a is
deﬁnable in FOL. Then,
(1) Filter[a](ϕ ∨ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ)∨ Filter[a](ψ),
(2) Filter[a](ϕ ∧ψ) ≡ Filter[a](ϕ)∧ Filter[a](ψ),
(3) Filter[a](¬ϕ) ≡ ¬Filter[a](ϕ)∧ Filter[a](TRUE),
(4) Filter[a](∃xϕ(x)) ≡ ∃xFilter[a](ϕ(L))[L/x] .
Proof. See Appendix A.8. 
The decomposition strategy offered by this theorem is not only an approximation but an exact computation for 1:1
domains. These distribution properties are enough for decomposing the ﬁltering of any FOL formula into the ﬁltering of
its atomic subformulas. We can decompose the ﬁltering of any FOL formula into the ﬁltering of atomic formulas by using
distribution properties proved above. As an example, universally quantiﬁed formulas are decomposed as follows:
• Universal quantiﬁer over a formula: (by rule 3 and rule 4)
Filter[a](∀xϕ(x))≡ Filter[a](¬∃x¬ϕ(x))
3≡ ¬Filter[a](∃x¬ϕ(x))∧ Filter[a](TRUE)
4≡ ¬∃xFilter[a](¬ϕ(L)) ∧ Filter[a](TRUE)[L/x]
A. Shirazi, E. Amir / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 193–219 203PROCEDURE FF(〈ai ,oi〉0<it , ψ )
∀i, ai an action, oi an observation, ψ a belief-state formula.
(1) if t = 0, return ψ .
(2) return ot∧ FF-Step(at , precondat ∧ FF(〈ai ,oi〉0<i(t−1) , ψ )).
PROCEDURE FF-Step(a, ψ )
a an action, ψ a belief-state formula.
(1) if ψ is an atomic formula, then return Single-Literal-Filtering(a, ψ ).
(2) else, use distribution properties as follows:
(3) if ψ = φ ∨ ϕ , return FF-Step(a, φ) ∨ FF-Step(a, ϕ).
(4) elseif ψ = φ ∧ ϕ , return FF-Step(a, φ) ∧ FF-Step(a, ϕ).
(5) elseif ψ = ¬φ , return ¬ FF-Step(a, φ) ∧ FF-Step(a, TRUE).
(6) elseif ψ = ∃x φ(x), return ∃x FF-Step(a, φ(L))[L/x] .
Fig. 2. Factored ﬁltering of a FOL formula in a 1:1 domain.
• Universal quantiﬁer over conjunction: (by rule 2)
Filter[a](∀xϕ(x)∧ψ(x)) 2≡ Filter[a](∀x ϕ(x))∧ Filter[a](∀xψ(x))
• Universal quantiﬁer over negation: (by rule 3 and rule 4)
Filter[a](∀x¬ϕ(x)) ≡ Filter[a](¬∃x ϕ(x))
3,4≡ ¬∃xFilter[a](ϕ(L))[L/x] ∧ Filter[a](TRUE)
• Universal quantiﬁer over disjunction: (by rule 2, rule 3, and rule 4)
Filter[a](∀xϕ(x)∨ψ(x)) ≡ Filter[a](¬∃x ¬ϕ(x)∧ ¬ψ(x))
3,4≡ ¬∃xFilter[a](¬ϕ(L)∧ ¬ψ(L))[L/x] ∧ Filter[a](TRUE)
4.2. Factored ﬁltering
Our Factored Filtering (FF) algorithm for 1:1 domains is presented in Fig. 2. It relies on Theorems 8, 11, and 13. The
number of closed atomic subformulas of a domain is ﬁnite, if the number of constants is ﬁnite. Therefore, in ﬁnite domains
we can calculate ﬁltering of all atomic formulas as a preprocessing step and retrieve them later. (Note that the arguments
of these atomic formulas are either the constants associated with existential quantiﬁers or the constants mentioned in the
initial belief state, the set of axioms, or the observations.) We discuss this preprocessing step below.
Theorem 14. Let D be a basic action theory, and ψ an initial belief state. Algorithm FF (Fig. 2) returns a formula that is logically
equivalent to Filter[a](ψ), if a is 1:1 in D and precompilation of D with respect to a has a ﬁnite representation. It runs in time
O (|preconda ∧ψ | × F ) when the ﬁltering of all the atomic formulas are given and have ﬁnite representation, and F is the time needed
to retrieve the ﬁltering of an atomic formula.
Proof. See Appendix A.9. 
4.2.1. Example computation with FF
First, consider a push-button action that permutes the states of two locks, d, e as follows:
d,¬e ⇒ d, e ⇒ ¬d, e ⇒ ¬d,¬e ⇒ d,¬e
Successor-state axioms for this domain are
d
(
do(a, s)
)≡ a = push∧ ¬e(s)∨ a = push∧ d(s)
e
(
do(a, s)
)≡ a = push∧ d(s)∨ a = push∧ e(s) (3)
Precompilation of progression of the four literals with A = push yields
Filter[A](d) ≡ e
Filter[A](¬d) ≡ ¬e
Filter[A](e) ≡ ¬d
Filter[A](¬e) ≡ d (4)
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when ∀w up(w) and the world stays the same otherwise. We call the new action A′ = push2. Successor-state axioms for
this domain are
d
(
do(a, s)
)≡ a = push2∧ ((∀w up(w))∧ ¬e(s))∨
d(s)∧ (a = push2∨ (a = push2∧ ¬(∀w up(w))))
e
(
do(a, s)
)≡ a = push2∧ ((∀w up(w))∧ d(s))∨
e(s)∧ (a = push2∨ (a = push2∧ ¬(∀w up(w)))) (5)
(Successor-state axioms are of the form F (x,do(a, s)) ≡ γ+F (x,a) ∨ (F (x, s) ∧ ¬γ−F (x,a)), and γ+F (x,a), γ−F (x,a) are dis-
junctions of formulas of the form ∃z[a = A(y)∧φ(y)] with φ quantiﬁer free uniform in s and y the exclusive union of x, z.)
Precompilation of progression of the three atomic formulas with A′ = push2 yields
Filter
[
A′
]
(e) ≡ ((∀w up(w))⇒ ¬d)∧ (¬(∀w up(w))⇒ e)
Filter
[
A′
]
(d) ≡ ((∀w up(w))⇒ e)∧ (¬(∀w up(w))⇒ d)
Filter
[
A′
](
up(w)
)≡ up(w)
Filter
[
A′
]
(TRUE) ≡ TRUE (6)
(Filter[A′](¬e), Filter[A′](¬d), Filter[A′](¬up(w)) are computed by noticing that A′ is 1:1, so Filter[A′](¬ϕ) ≡
Filter[A′](TRUE) ∧ ¬F itler[A′](ϕ).) This precompilation is then used as the results returned by subroutine Single-Literal-
Filtering.
4.2.2. Precompilation
Algorithm FF uses a subroutine for ﬁltering atoms (recall, atoms are predicate symbols applied to well-founded terms,
i.e. including no quantiﬁers or logical connectives). Such ﬁltering of atomic formulas can be done at a compilation (prepro-
cessing) stage for a domain, if Filter[a](P (x1, . . . , xl)) is ﬁnitely axiomatizable (in FOL), for every action a and predicate P .
Corollary 15. Let a be an action term, P (t1, . . . , tl) an atom, and t1, . . . , tl constant symbols. Let X1, . . . , Xl be new constant sym-
bols. If Filter[a](P (X1, . . . , Xl)) has a ﬁnite axiomatization in FOL and ϕ is such an axiomatization, then Filter[a](P (t1, . . . , tl)) ≡
ϕ[X1/t1,...,Xl/tl] .
Proof. Follows the same proof as equivalence (4) in Theorem 11. 
Thus, if the domain description language includes no function symbols and the language is ﬁnite (we assume both), then
the compilation needs to occur only once per predicate-and-action pair.
Notice that these assumptions are not related to the size of the domain, which may be inﬁnite. Our assumptions permit
FOL theories for time step 0 that have only inﬁnite models. For example, consider the example in Section 4.2.1 above. An
example belief state for time step 0 is
∀w∃x after(w, x)∧ (up(w) ⇒ up(x))
∀w, x after(w, x) ⇒ x = w
∀x, y, z after(x, y)∧ after(y, z) ⇒ after(x, z)
Here, the predicate after(.,.) is a strict order relation and every element has at least one subsequent other element. This
forces the universe of every model to be of inﬁnite size. The ﬁltering of action push2 holds without change.
Thus, ﬁltering of atoms can be done at a compilation (preprocessing) stage. Such a compilation would be done once for
the domain, and would then be used for all ﬁltering needs within that domain.
For n actions and m predicates, the precompilation would be done for n ·m pairs. Every such compilation of an atom,
P ( X), and action, a(Y ), can be done by applying FOL consequence ﬁnding (e.g. [32,57,58,42,2]) of sentences uniform in
do(y, s) from P (x, s)∧Σ ∪ Dss ∪ Dap ∪ Duna.
If our action theory D also conforms to other restrictions (e.g. strictly local actions in [65]), the precompilation can be
done directly (in [65,64] the size of the resulting formula per compilation step is Ω(2p·ck ), even when polynomial-size
representation is possible, so the result of precompilation may undermine the eﬃciency and output-compactness of FF).
Thus, any of the above methods can be used to implement Single-Literal-Filtering of Fig. 2 and precompute it in a
compilation stage into a table SLF that has size O (n ·m), storing every compilation of literal and ground action term. Then,
the computation with FF of progression of ψ with action a(y) uses Single-Literal-Filtering as a table lookup, and takes both
time and output size in O (|SLF| · |ψ |).
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Our naive ﬁltering algorithm from Section 3 uses consequence ﬁnding tools which do not scale to large domains. Theo-
rem 17 below suggests a different reasoning procedure by which updates are broken into smaller local updates. Before that,
we need to deﬁne the set of derived-formulas of a set of predicates.
Deﬁnition 16 (Derived-formulas). Let p1, . . . , pn be n closed predicates. DF(p1, . . . , pn) is the set of derived-formulas of
p1, . . . , pn which is deﬁned inductively as follows:
(1) {p1, . . . , pn} ⊂ DF(p1, . . . , pn),
(2) ¬φ ∈ DF(p1, . . . , pn) if φ ∈ DF(p1, . . . , pn),
(3) φ ∧ψ ∈ DF(p1, . . . , pn) if {φ,ψ} ⊂ DF(p1, . . . , pn),
(4) ∀x φ(y1, . . . , ym)[y1/x1,...,ym/xm] if φ(y1, . . . , ym) ∈ DF(p1, . . . , pn).
For example,
∀x∀y book(x)∧ room(y)∧ in(x, y) ∈ DF(book(x1), room(x2), in(x3, x4))
because book(x1) ∧ room(x2) ∧ in(x3, x4) is a derived-formula and we can perform rule 4 on this formula and substitute x1
and x3 by x, and x2 and x4 by y.
Theorem 17. Let a be a ground action, ψ be a belief state formula, and p1, . . . , pn be n closed predicates in our action theory. Then,
Filter[a](ψ) ≡ {Φ(p1, . . . , pn) ∈ DF(p1, . . . , pn) ∣∣ψ ∧ preconda |	 Φ(p1, . . . , pn)[p1/succp1,a,...,pn/succpn,a]
}
(7)
Proof. See Appendix A.10. 
In this formula, every Φ in DF(p1, . . . , pn) that is entailed by our belief state and action precondition is in the ﬁltering.
Generally, generating all Φs is impossible in practice because there are inﬁnitely many such Φs. In the following sections, we
provide simpler closed-form solutions for two special cases of dynamic domains.1 These give rise to practical (polynomial)
algorithms.
5.1. Unit-case successor state axioms
By deﬁnition of successor state axioms, for every pair of actions and predicates exactly one successor state axiom is
provided. The successor state axiom for action a = A(x1, . . . , xn) and predicate p can be rewritten in the following form:
Poss
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
) ⇒ ∀y1, . . . ,∀ym (p(y1, . . . , ym,do(a, s))
⇔ (case1p ⇒ φ1p(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, s))
∧· · · ∧ (caselpp ⇒ φlpp (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, s))
∧ (¬case1p ∧ · · · ∧ ¬caselpp ) ⇒ φlp+1p (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, s))
where case jp is of the form (y
j1
p = x j1p ) ∧ · · · ∧ (y jkp = x jkp ) (variable x j1p is an argument of action a and variable y j1p is an
argument of predicate p) and each variable assignment satisﬁes at most one of the cases. Note that the set of variables in each
case can be a subset of variables in p and a.
Notice that the algorithms presented in this section and the following require Unique Names Axioms for objects. This is
because we would like to determine which case a ground predicate corresponds to without checking if the constants are
equal, e.g., p(B) is not from the case p(y,do(a, s)) ⇔ (y = A) ⇒ TRUE (A and B are constants). Also we would like to be
able to say if two instantiated predicates are uniﬁable without adding equality preconditions, e.g., p(A, y) is not uniﬁable
with p(B,C) with unique name assumption. However, without this assumption any two predicates with the same predicate
symbols are uniﬁable (if (B = A) then p(B,C) and p(A, y) are uniﬁable).
A successor state axiom is called unit-case successor state axiom if it can be rewritten in a form where every
φ
j
p(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, s) (1 j  lp + 1) is a unit clause. Our book-carrying robot example from Section 2.2.1 is written
in this form. The last term in the precondition assures that the cases are mutually exclusive.
We divide a unit-case successor state axiom into multiple instantiated axioms.
1 Those domains were shown independently to have ﬁnite strong progression in FOL [65].
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∀i, ai an action, oi an observation, ψ a belief-state formula.
(1) if t = 0, return ψ .
(2) ψt−1 = UCF(〈ai ,oi〉0<i(t−1) , ψ ).
(3) return ot∧ Filter-True(at ) ∧ UCStep(at ,precondat ∧ψt−1).
PROCEDURE Filter-True(A(x1, . . . , xn)) [Done once and cashed]
A(x1, . . . , xn) an action.
(1) S = ∅
(2) for every predicate symbol p, for every case of p,
(3) [Poss(A(x1, . . . , xn), s) ⇒ (condp ⇒ (p(z1, . . . , zm,do(a, s)) ⇔
(4) φp(z1, . . . , zm+n, s))) is a successor state axiom of a casea]
(5) if φp(z1, . . . , zm+n) = true, S = S ∪ {condp ⇒ p(z1, . . . , zm)}
(6) elseif φp(z1, . . . , zm+n) = false, S = S ∪ {condp ⇒ ¬p(z1, . . . , zm)}
(7) for every predicate symbol pair p, p′ , for every case of each,
(8) if uniﬁable(φp(z1, . . . , zm+n),φp′ (z1, . . . , zm+n)),
(9) S = S ∪ {((condp ∧ condp′ ) ⇒ (p(z1, . . . , zm) ⇔
(10) p′(z1, . . . , zm)))mgu(φp ,φp′ )}
(11) elseif uniﬁable(φp(z1, . . . , zm+n),¬φp′ (z1, . . . , zm+n)),
(12) S = S ∪ {((condp ∧ condp′ ) ⇒ (p(z1, . . . , zm) ⇔
(13) ¬p′(z1, . . . , zm)))mgu(φp ,φp′ )}
(14) elseif φp(z1, . . . , zm+n) = ∀x q(x),φp′ (z1, . . . , zm+n) = q(T ),
(15) S = S ∪ {(condp ∧ condp′ ) ⇒ (¬p(z1, . . . , zm)∨ p′(z1, . . . , zm))}
(16) elseif φp(z1, . . . , zm+n) = ∀x q(x),φp′ (z1, . . . , zm+n) = ¬q(T ),
(17) S = S ∪ {(condp ∧ condp′ ) ⇒ (¬p(z1, . . . , zm)∨ ¬p′(z1, . . . , zm))}
(18) elseif φp(z1, . . . , zm+n) = ∃x q(x),φp′ (z1, . . . , zm+n) = q(T ),
(19) S = S ∪ {(condp ∧ condp′ ) ⇒ (p(z1, . . . , zm)∨ ¬p′(z1, . . . , zm))}
(20) elseif φp(z1, . . . , zm+n) = ∃x q(x),φp′ (z1, . . . , zm+n) = ¬q(T ),
(21) S = S ∪ {(condp ∧ condp′ ) ⇒ (p(z1, . . . , zm)∨ p′(z1, . . . , zm))}
(22) return
∧
ϕ∈S ϕ .
a condp is either TRUE or (¬case1p ∧ · · · ∧ ¬caselpp ) using Deﬁnition 18.
Fig. 3. Unit-case ﬁltering.
Deﬁnition 18. Instantiated successor state axioms for predicate p are:
• Poss(A(x1, . . . , xn), s) ⇒ (p(y1, . . . , ym,do(a, s)) ⇔ φ jp(x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, s))[y jp/x jp ] for all 1 j  lp ,
• Poss(A(x1, . . . , xn), s) ⇒ ∀y1, . . . , ym(¬case1p∧· · ·∧¬caselpp ) ⇒ (p(y1, . . . , ym,do(a, s)) ⇔ φlp+1p (x1, . . . , xn, y1, . . . , ym, s)).
[y jp/x jp] is the substitution corresponding to case jp (y jp and x jp are sequences of variables). This process is called breaking
into cases. Note that all instantiated successor state axioms are in the form
Poss
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
) ⇒ (condp ⇒ (p(z1, . . . , zm,do(a, s)) ⇔ φp(z1, . . . , zm+n, s)))
where in some of them condp is TRUE (i is an enumeration of all instantiated successor state axioms of action a). In
this formula zp is either a variable which is universally quantiﬁed or one of the parameters of action A(x1, . . . , xn). The
parameters of action A(x1, . . . , xn) are free variables.
Figs. 3 and 4 show the Unit-Case Filtering (UCF) algorithm. This algorithm is applicable to 1:1 domains whose successor
state axioms are unit-case. Algorithm UCF is actually a way to compute every Φ(p1, . . . , pn) in formula (7). Here, p1, . . . , pn
are the predicates of the instantiated successor state axioms after breaking into cases. Therefore, some of the arguments of
these predicates are constant symbols that appear in our ground action.
In 1:1 domains the head of the entailment of formula (7) is an atomic formula since we use distribution properties
of Theorem 13 on ψ ∧ preconda . The distribution properties (discussed above) break the conjunction of belief state and
precondition into atomic subformulas. Consequently, Φ(p1, . . . , pn)[p1/succp1,a,...,pn/succpn ,a] is either equivalent to that atomic
formula or a tautology. The size of a tautology is at most two when unit-case successor state axioms are used. Therefore,
we can compute all desired Φs in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Theorem 19. Let progression be ﬁrst-order deﬁnable, l be the number of successor state axioms after breaking into cases, and ψ be
the belief state formula. Algorithm UCF returns the ﬁltering of ψ with a and o in time O (Rl(l + |ψ | + |preconda|)) where R is the
maximum arity of all predicates. The length of the returned formula is O (Rl(l + |ψ | + |preconda|)).
Proof. See Appendix A.11. 
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A(x1, . . . , xn) an action, ψ a belief-state formula.
(1) if ψ is an atomic formula then
(2) S = ∅
(3) for every predicate symbol p and every case of p,
(4) [Poss(A(x1, . . . , xn), s) ⇒ (condp ⇒ (p(z1, . . . , zm,do(a, s)) ⇔
(5) φp(z1, . . . , zm+n, s))) is a successor state axiom of a casea]
(6) if uniﬁable(φp(z1, . . . , zm+n),ψ)
(7) S = S ∪ {(condp ⇒ p(z1, . . . , zm))mgu(φp ,ψ)}
(8) elseif uniﬁable(φp(z1, . . . , zm+n),¬ψ)
(9) S = S ∪ {(condp ⇒ ¬p(z1, . . . , zm))mgu(φp ,ψ)}
(10) return
∧
ϕ∈S ϕ .
(11) else, use distribution properties as follows:
(12) if ψ = φ ∨ ϕ
(13) return UCStep(A(x1, . . . , xn), φ) ∨ UCStep(A(x1, . . . , xn), ϕ).
(14) elseif ψ = φ ∧ ϕ
(15) return UCStep(A(x1, . . . , xn), φ) ∧ UCStep(A(x1, . . . , xn), ϕ).
(16) elseif ψ = ¬φ
(17) return ¬ UCStep(A(x1, . . . , xn), φ) ∧
(18) UCStep(A(x1, . . . , xn), TRUE).
(19) elseif ψ = ∃x φ(x), return ∃x UCStep(A(x1, . . . , xn)s, φ(L))[L/x] .
a condp is either TRUE or (¬case1p ∧ · · · ∧ ¬caselpp ) using Deﬁnition 18.
Fig. 4. One step unit-case ﬁltering.
5.1.1. Example
Consider our book-keeping robot example from Section 2.2.1. Suppose that we have two rooms, oﬃce and lounge, and
two books, C++ and Java, and our belief state formula is in(C++,Oﬃce)∧ in(Java, Lounge). Assume students studying in the
lounge need the C++ tutorial for a while, so the book keeper robot decides to move the book to the lounge. The action is
move(C++,Oﬃce, Lounge). It has unit-case successor state axioms.
Our algorithm UCF works as follows. First, we add the precondition to the belief state formula. The new belief state is
(since (Oﬃce = Lounge), the last term of precondition is true):
in(C++,Oﬃce)∧ in(Java, Lounge)∧ book(C++)∧ room(Oﬃce)∧ room(Lounge)
We calculate the ﬁltering of all the atomic formulas of the belief state formula separately and compute the result by
using our distribution properties. What follows is the formula for one of these atomic formulas based on the algorithm
presented above.
Filter
[
move(C++,Oﬃce, Lounge)](in(Java, Lounge))≡ in(C++, Lounge)∧ ¬in(C++,Oﬃce)∧ in(Java, Lounge)
Now suppose that we ﬁlter the belief state after receiving the following observation. The robot enters the oﬃce and it
observes that there is only one book in the room. A perfect ﬁltering algorithm guarantees that in such cases the book is the
same book that the robot has put in the room before.
Assume that the belief state formula is in(C++,Oﬃce)∧ in(Java, Lounge). The observation is ∀x in(x,Oﬃce) ⇒ x= TheBook.
Filter[o](ψ) |	 TheBook= C++, and we can replace every instance of TheBook in the new belief state formula by C++.
5.2. STRIPS domains
In STRIPS domains [18,37] actions have no conditional effects. It means that the value of each predicate either changes
to true, changes to FALSE, or remains the same. STRIPS actions are not necessarily 1:1. Consequently STRIPS successor state
axioms cannot be treated by algorithm UCF even though they are unit-case. Successor state axioms in STRIPS domains are
of the form:
Poss(a, s) ⇒ ∀y1, . . . ,∀ym
(
p
(
y1, . . . , ym,do(a, s)
) ⇔ (case1p ⇒ φ1p(y1, . . . , ym, s))
∧· · · ∧ (caselpp ⇒ φlpp (y1, . . . , ym, s))∧ (¬case1p ∧ · · · ∧ ¬caselpp ) ⇒ p(y1, . . . , ym, s)) (8)
where φ jp(y1, . . . , ym, s) ( j  lp) is either TRUE or FALSE. Notice that case jp can assign equality to a subset of parameters
of p as in the previous section. case jp is of the form (y
j1
p = x j1p ) ∧ · · · ∧ (y jkp = x jkp ) where variable x j1p is an argument of
action a and variable y j1p is an argument of predicate p.
We can instantiate an action by constants c1, . . . , cn . An instantiated action a is equal to A(c1, . . . , cn). A case after
instantiation of action a is case[x1,...,xn/c1,...,cn] (we omit p and j from case
j
p for simplicity).
Denote case(a) = case(A(c1, . . . , cn)) = case[x1,...,xn/c1,...,cn] .
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∀i, ai an action, oi an observation and ψ a belief state formula. oi and ψ
in EAFOL (the form ∃∗∀∗φ).
(1) if t = 0, return ψ .
(2) return Move-Quana(ot∧ FO-STRIPS-Step(at ,
(3) Move-Quan(precondat ∧ FOSF(〈ai ,oi〉0<i(t−1) , ψ ))))
a Moves all the quantiﬁers to the front with fresh variable names.
PROCEDURE FO-STRIPS-Step(a, ψ )
a an action, ψ = ∃∗∀∗∧i ci a belief-state formula.
(1) if ψ = ∃x φ(x), return ∃x FO-STRIPS-Step(a, φ(L))[L/x]
(2) // L is a fresh constant that does not appear in the language
(3) elseif ψ = ∀x φ(x), return ∀x FO-STRIPS-Step(a, φ(x))
(4) else
(5) ψsplit ← split every clause in ψ into casesa
(6) E ← {ϕ | ϕ ∈ ψsplit and there is l ∈ atom(ϕ) and l′ ∈ Eff(a)
(7) such that l is an instance of l′}
(8) S ← ψsplit \ E
(9) For all l ∈ Eff(a)
(10) E ← resolve-out(l, E)b
(11) φ =∧c∈E∪S c
(12) Eff+(a) ← literals affected to TRUE
(13) Eff−(a) ← literals affected to FALSE
(14) return φ ∧∧p(v)∈Eff+(a) p(v)∧∧p(v)∈Eff−(a) ¬p(v).
a The deﬁnition of such splitting appears in Eq. (9).
b Resolve-out: uses resolution on all instances of l in E . After all resolu-
tions are done, we select only those clauses that mention no instance of l
or its negation.
Fig. 5. First-order STRIPS ﬁltering.
A STRIPS action affects the truth value of some of the instantiated predicates and keeps the value of the others. An
instantiated predicate is a predicate symbol with some arguments constants and others variables. We refer to the set of
affected instantiated predicates as Eff(a). Eff(a, p) is deﬁned as follows:
Eff(a, p) = {p(y1, . . . , ym)[yi1/vi1 ,...]
∣∣ case jp(a) = ((yi1 = ci1)∧ · · ·) for case j of a, p}
Eff(a) is:
Eff(a) =
⋃
p∈Pred
Eff(a, p)
Therefore, |Eff(a, p)|, the number of elements in the set Eff(a, p), is exactly the number of cases, l of p, a. |Eff(a)|, the
number of elements in the set Eff(a), is
∑
p∈Pred |Eff(a, p)|, the total number of cases stated for a and any predicate ﬂuent.
An affected literal (an atomic formula or its negation) is any atom in Eff(a), a negation of such an atom, or a literal whose
further instantiation (after replacing some variables with terms) without negation is in Eff(a).
Our First-Order STRIPS Filtering (FOSF) algorithm is presented in Fig. 5. A FOL formula is in EAFOL if no existential
quantiﬁer appears within the scope of a universal quantiﬁer. The input to FOSF is assumed to be a belief state formula
∃∗∀∗φ in EAFOL (∃∗ refers to any number  0 of existential quantiﬁcations of variables; ∀∗ refers to any number  0 of
universal quantiﬁcations of variables) with no equality, and with observation formulas φ provided in clausal form.
Step (5) of our algorithm splits every clause in the clausal form of φ into cases. It does so to allow treating instances of
predicates which are affected by a differently from those which are not affected by a. We call this step splitting into cases.
We split every clause ϕ as in the algorithm described below.
Let p(v) be an atom in ϕ (v is a vector of variables and constants). Then, let v j be the instantiation of v for case jp(a)
deﬁned as follows (v = 〈w1, . . . ,wm〉 and each wi is a constant or variable):
(1) v = 〈w1, . . . ,wm〉
(2) For i = 1 to n
(3) if wi is constant, and yi = c j is in case(a) then
(4) If wi = c j , return TRUE
(5) Else set ui = c j
(6) Else wi is variable,
(7) If yi = c j in case(a) set ui = c j
(8) Else set ui = wi
(9) return p(u1, . . . ,um)
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We split every clause ϕ into:
ϕ[v/ v1], . . . , ϕ[v/ vlp ],
(¬case1p ∧ · · · ∧ ¬caselpp ⇒ ϕ) (9)
Note that we treat (¬case1p ∧ · · · ∧ ¬caselpp ⇒ ϕ) as a single literal which is not affected by our action. Also, as mentioned
above, we require Unique-Names Axioms for objects here.
Example. Let casep1 = (x1 = A) and casep2 = (x1 = A). Let ϕ = p(x1, B)∨ q(x1). We split this with respect to predicate p into
cases. The result would be
p(A, B)∨ q(A), ((x1 = A) ⇒ p(x1, B)∨ q(x1)) (10)
The new clausal form of φ is divided into two parts: clauses with no affected literals and clauses that have at least one
affected literal. The algorithm directly copies the ﬁrst part to the new belief state formula. It also adds all the consequences
of the second part in which no affected literal exists, to the new belief state formula. The literals that are not affected are
the only ones who stay the same in the new belief state. Then all predicates in Eff(a) are added to the new belief state
formula as positive or negative literals (depending on whether they change to TRUE or FALSE).
An example of how the FOSF algorithm works is shown in Fig. 6. The action is move(Java, Lounge,Oﬃce). You can ﬁnd
the successor state axioms of this action in Section 2.2.1. Based on this axiom:
Eff
(
move(Java, Lounge,Oﬃce)
)= {in(Java, Lounge), in(Java,Oﬃce)}
The top line in the ﬁgure is the current belief state. Some instances of the ﬁrst literal in the belief state are affected and
some are not (in(Java, Lounge) is affected, and for every other book in(b, Lounge) is not affected). We split this clause into
two clauses. There is no literal in these clauses that has both affected and unaffected instances. The middle line of the ﬁgure
shows the belief state after splitting into cases. In the ﬁrst clause one of the literals is affected, so we try to resolve it with
other clauses in our knowledge base (since we have no other clauses, it is discarded). The second clause has no affected
literal. We copy it directly to the new belief state. At the end, all the predicates in Eff(move(Java, Lounge,Oﬃce)) are added
as positive or negative literals.
Theorem 20. Let action a, observation o, and belief state formula ψ in EAFOL be given to FOSF as input. Assume progression is ﬁrst-
order deﬁnable, let l be the maximum number of cases in all successor state axioms. Assume that every case of a instantiates all
variables. Then, algorithm FOSF returns the ﬁltering of ψ with a and o in time O ((l · |ψ |)2|Eff(a)|).
Proof. See Appendix A.12. 
Theorem 21. Let progression be ﬁrst-order deﬁnable and let C be the number of constant symbols appearing in the domain description.
Let R be the maximum arity of predicates and m be the number of predicates. If ψ is in 2-FO-CNF,2 the length of formula after ﬁltering
with t actions a1, . . . ,at is bounded by O (m2 · (R + C)2R), a term independent of t. The time taken for ﬁltering each action a is
O (m2 · (R + C)2R).
2 An EAFOL is in k-FO-CNF if it is in clausal CNF, and the size of each clause is at most k.
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Thus, these theorems give a polynomial time and space guarantees for ﬁltering (polynomial in the number of predicates
and the length of action sequence). Importantly, Theorem 21 gives a bound on the size of our belief state representation, |ψ |,
that is maintained after T > 0 steps. This bound is important for ensuring tractable (polynomial time) ﬁltering indeﬁnitely,
since the inference time per step is polynomial in |ψ |. (Notice that without this result it is possible that one step of ﬁltering
results in a belief states of size O (|ψ |2), then compounding over T steps to belief state of size O (|ψ |2T ).)
6. Related works
Several research streams in AI concern problems that are relevant to our work here. We divide the work relevant to
ours into four parts: works within logical AI and Databases that focus on reasoning about actions; works within stochastic
ﬁltering and state estimation in Markov Chains; and works between Philosophy, Linguistics, and AI that focus on Belief
Revision and Update. We choose not to cover learning in dynamic systems in this scope, but the two are related; see [1] for
details.
6.1. Reasoning about actions
Our work is closest to works on reasoning about actions. In its general form, Logical Filtering is a generalization of
Database Progression [66,39,40], formal veriﬁcation with Symbolic Model Checking [7,10], and Belief Update [27,55,28].
Those works that are closest to ours examine progression in FOL theories. In that context, work on ﬁltering is between
database progression and stochastic ﬁltering. While applying similar fundamental techniques to progression, ﬁltering’s goals
are different and so are the types of sought results. It aims at procedures that process a sequence of actions tractably
indeﬁnitely.
In a series of papers [51,38,40] Lin and Reiter deﬁned progression of FOL theories and showed that sometimes the ﬁltered
belief state has no representation within FOL. They also showed that FOL progression (the set of (possibly inﬁnite) FOL
consequences uniform in a situation) is enough to characterize progression for correct answers to queries in FOL pertaining
to any speciﬁed future ground situation term. [63,64] extended this work and showed that FOL progression is further enough
to answer correctly entailment of the form “after α, property φ will always be true.”
Those works are compatible with ours in that they establish correctness of FOL progression for classes of queries that
contain ours. They do not concern tractability, which is our focus here.
Somewhat closer to ours are works that ﬁnd classes of action theories for which progression is tractable or more eﬃcient
than in general. [21] studied cases of progression in which one can exploit correspondence between the situation calculus
and relational databases to build systems for reasoning about actions. It focuses on tractability results, but is based on
standard relational database technology, and assumes the initial knowledge base is complete (the initial belief state includes
exactly one state).
Following that line of research, [41,65] developed algorithms for incomplete initial knowledge bases. [41] developed
algorithms that can be applied to any proper initial knowledge (roughly, one that is consistent) and local actions (successor-
state axioms are of the form F (x,do(a, s)) ≡ γ+F (x,a) ∨ (F (x, s) ∧ ¬γ−F (x,a)), and γ+F (x,a), γ−F (x,a) are disjunctions of
formulas of the form ∃z[a = A(y) ∧ φ(y)] with φ quantiﬁer free uniform in s and y the exclusive union of x, z). However,
their progression algorithm is only complete when applied to context-complete knowledge, i.e., when knowledge is complete
about φ(.) when successor-state actions need to be applied. This differs from our results here in that we effectively restrict
the form of successor-state axioms, but do not make assumptions of completeness for the initial or intermediate knowledge.
[65] extended this work on actions of local effects, and showed that progression is always ﬁrst-order deﬁnable for those.
They also show that progression is ﬁnite when φ(.) has no quantiﬁers and includes only variables that appear in y (strictly
local effects). Their ﬁniteness result is important, but their formulas grow exponentially with even one progression step;
Theorem 2 in [65] computes projection and results in a disjunction of l disjuncts, where l is the number of “ J -models”
(we omit the deﬁnition here) of the progression, a number that is worst-case at least exponential in the number of ground
atoms.
In contrast, our results focus on progression that grows at most linearly with every step: Our results in Sections 4 and 5
focus on progression whose output is of size O ( f · |ψ |), where ψ is the input databases and where f is a constant that
depends only on the form of the action theory, D . Our ﬁnal result, Theorem 21, gives an even stronger result, bounding
the size of progression after T time steps (T actions and observations) by a polynomial O (T |ψ |2) of the input that grows
linearly with T . Such results are critical to practical ﬁltering over long sequences actions and observations.
A ﬁnal contrast with these previous results is the scope of action domains to which they apply. Speciﬁcally, our results
in Section 5 do not assume that the domain is strictly local. For example, the example action a′ = push2 shown in Eq. (6) in
our Section 4.2.1 is not a strictly local effect action, so it cannot be processed by the procedure of [65], whereas our FF can
process it in linear time and with only linear growth in the belief-state representation per progression step.
Finally, a related line of work to the ones above investigates Fluent Calculus [60,61] as a computationally eﬃcient means
for updating belief states. [60] introduces a dual representation for basic action theories based on state update axioms that
explicitly deﬁne the direct effects of each action. It starts from the Situation Calculus where successor state axioms are used
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logic to improve inferential aspects. [61] presents an implementation technique for progression based on the state update
axioms and the use of a constraint solver. Another work [24] extends the ﬂuent calculus by a method for belief change,
which allows agents to revise their internal model upon making observations that contradict this model.
The main difference that we draw between this work and ours is in that update in this framework trades off accuracy
for eﬃciency. While updates are generally eﬃcient, the results are not guaranteed to be a precise representation of the FOL
progression of ones’ belief state. These results are useful for our purposes as subroutines that may compute progression (e.g.,
in compilation of Section 4). However, no computational analysis of time or space is given by the author, so comparison is
hard.
6.2. Propositional progression and ﬁltering
Previous works that address tractable algorithms for exact ﬁltering focus on propositional cases and intractability results
for the general case of those.
[3] present eﬃcient logical ﬁltering algorithms that maintain a compact belief state representation indeﬁnitely, for a
broad range of environment classes including nondeterministic, partially observable successful-STRIPS environments (when
success/failure of the action is known) and environments in which actions act as 1:1 mapping on states. That work is
restricted to the propositional case.
Earlier research about the hardness of belief revision and update [17,35] focused on the properties of different update
semantics, showing that ﬁnding out if a query follows from the updated belief state is coNP-hard. [8] further showed that
many3 semantics discussed in the literature lead to an exponential growth in the representation size of any belief-state
representation scheme, if the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse.
Our contribution and focus are different from earlier work by our emphasis on FOL and on tractable, scalable ﬁltering
techniques for indeﬁnite online processing of updates. These would take computation time that depends only linearly on the
number of time steps. We focus on tractable cases, and apply belief update semantics that is easier for analysis and com-
putation. Our approach focuses on AI applications in partially observable domains, and is closer in spirit to data-intensive
control-theory approaches to tracking of dynamic systems.
6.3. Stochastic ﬁltering
Early work, beginning with Gauss, assumed stochastic models. For example, the Kalman ﬁlter [26] is a ubiquitous device
that maintains a multivariate Gaussian belief state over n variables, assuming linear-Gaussian transition and sensor model.
Crucially, the O (n3) update cost and the O (n2) space requirement do not depend on the length of the observation sequence. This
type of tractability permits the Kalman ﬁlter to run indeﬁnitely and enables well-known applications [59,43]. This type of
recursive estimation motivates our term logical ﬁltering.
Stochastic ﬁltering and reasoning in probabilistic dynamic models is an area of vast literature and common everyday
applications [45]. Progress and research on it is divided between Statistics [30], Artiﬁcial Intelligence [47,16], and Control
Theory [43,12]. Research on stochastic ﬁltering focuses on Hidden Markov Models [50,19] and Dynamic Bayesian Networks
[13,23,48]. Reasoning and estimation with these models is hard when the systems dynamics or sensor model are not
Gaussian-linear and the number of state features is of modest size (e.g., a hundred features, thus  2100 states).
The diﬃculty of stochastic ﬁltering led early to modern research to focus on reasoning techniques that approximate
the model [59,47,30,6,62,31] or approximate inference in the model via sampling [15,16]. Unfortunately, these still require
exponential-time computations or produce poor approximations in most cases (approximations work in practice for some
applications), especially when the transition model includes states deﬁned from discrete variables [48,5]. This diﬃculty is a
second motivation for our work here (the ﬁrst are immediate applications [9]).
Logical Filtering is close to stochastic ﬁltering, only without probabilities in belief state, transition model, or sensor model.
The ﬁlter’s ﬁrst input is a representation for belief state σ0 ⊆ S , where S ⊆ Pow(P) is the system’s set of states deﬁned
with propositional ﬂuents P (ﬂuents are state features that change over time). The ﬁlter’s second input is a representation
for transition relation R ⊆ S × S , with 〈s, s′〉 ∈ R iff state s at time t may transition to state s′ at time t + 1 for any t  0.
The ﬁlter’s ﬁnal input is a sequence of representations of observations o0:T , for ot ⊆ S , given in an online fashion, one per
time step t  T . The ﬁlter’s task is to update the belief state representation recursively to σt (returning σt when requested
to) so that it accounts exactly for all the states that are consistent with σ0,R,o0:t .
An inquiry in logical ﬁltering is typical of inference from logical knowledge bases, e.g., satisﬁability checking (e.g., is
it possible that A is on B?), entailment (e.g., must it be that A is on B?), and checking the feasibility of a state (e.g., is state
{inHand(B),onTable(A)} possible?).
3 They also show that the WIDTIO (When In Doubt Throw It Out) semantics has a compact representation. This is so because one can always discard
information to achieve a compact representation.
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Important research that is related to ours is on the usage of FOL for belief update, either as holder of a belief formula or
as supplying some of the semantics involved with different revision tasks. Examples of the ﬁrst are [11,14] (ﬁrst-order AGM
belief revision) and [66] (belief update and revision in simple subclasses of FOL).
An important difference that we draw with these works is that ours provides eﬃcient inference procedures, while those
lines of work focus on the use of general-purpose theorem provers and provide only intractability results.
[34] presents an approach for incorporating a new piece of knowledge into knowledge bases about actions and change.
Their approach is different from all other belief revision operations since they consider another criterion: A possible cause
explaining the new fact and all the effects of the possible cause should be added and all cause-effect relations should be
maintained. This is called possible cause approach (PCA).
Interestingly, a set of works examined the question of how belief update and progression are related with each other.
[36] shows that several different semantics for belief update can be expressed in a single framework for reasoning about
actions. That framework can be considered as a common core of all these update formalisms. In the other direction, [29]
shows that belief update is a speciﬁc case of feedback-free action progression. It also presented reverse update, which is to
regression as update is to progression.
Similarly, works on iterated belief revision [54,25] examine the belief change associated with performing actions. They
assume a theory of action represented in the situation calculus and extended to deal with belief. Their belief revision
corresponds to our observations, where belief update corresponds to update with actions.
7. Conclusions
We presented semantics and methodology for eﬃcient ﬁltering in domains that include many objects. Some of our
algorithms allow objects whose identity is not certain. We generalized this problem to ﬁltering FOL formulas with ground
actions and FOL observations.
Previous results guarantee that FOL representations are suﬃcient for ﬁltering. We showed that such ﬁltering is solvable
in polynomial time when actions map states 1:1 (after precompilation of the domain), or the actions have a case-based
representation (this includes STRIPS actions whose success or failure are observed). We showed that 1:1 actions allow us to
ﬁlter FOL belief state formulas in linear time per time step in the size of belief-state representation, given an algorithm for
computing the progression of atomic formulas, and assuming this algorithm compiles our domain (and terminates) before
ﬁltering commences.
When actions are successful-STRIPS or Unit-Case, we can ﬁlter arbitrary belief state formulas eﬃciently without pre-
compilation. We showed that for a class of actions and belief states (roughly, corresponding to conjunctions of ﬁrst-order
clauses of size 2) belief state formulas are guaranteed to remain represented compactly (polynomial size in the initial belief
state representation and the number of time steps T ) for arbitrary action-observation sequence lengths, T . Those cases per-
mit ﬁltering of actions and observations indeﬁnitely in polynomial time (in the number of predicates and constants of our
domain).
Tractable ﬁltering is important for many practical, everyday life applications. Technologies such as the ones presented in
this paper are important for practical natural-language processing (NLP), autonomous agents in robotics and WWW domains
[9], game playing [49], and state estimation more generally [22]. In those applications it is crucial that processing be eﬃcient
for large numbers of states and large domains. The eﬃcient processing algorithms reported in this paper and those that we
hope will be derived in the future are key to new applications in these domains. We expect uses of our algorithms in these
domains, and hope to help introducing FOL-based tractable applications into mainstream AI, including NLP, autonomous
agents, robot motion planning and world-state estimation, and partial knowledge games.
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Appendix A. Proofs
A.1. Proof of Theorem 7: Filtering algorithm
We show that the left-hand side is contained in the right-hand side.
Filter[a]({S | |	S ψ})⊆ {S ′ ∣∣ |	S ′ Filter[a](ψ)}
Take S ′ ∈ Filter[a]({S | |	S ψ}). From Deﬁnition 6, there is an S such that S ∈ {S | |	S ψ} and 〈S,a, S ′〉 ∈ RD . In other words,
there is an S such that |	S ψ and 〈S,a, S ′〉 ∈ RD .
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restricted to our ﬁrst-order language L. Let P be the set of all constants and predicates in L. For each element of P (g ∈ P)
we deﬁne a new symbol g′ . The set of all these new symbols is called P ′ . We deﬁne structure S ′′ on language L ∪ P ′ such
that |S ′′| = |S|, for each g ∈ P , gS ′′ = gS and for each g′ ∈ P ′ , g′S ′′ = gS ′ where g′ is the new symbol for g .
We claim that |	S ′′ ξ where ξ is
ψ ∧ preconda ∧
∧
i
∀y1 . . .∀ym p′i(y1, . . . , ym) ⇔ succpi ,a(y1, . . . , ym)∧
∧
i
∀z f ′i = z ⇔ succ fi ,a(z)
S ′′ does not model ξ only if one of the conjuncts is falsiﬁed. This in not the case for ψ or preconda by our choice of S .
Assume by contradiction that this is the case for some i (i.e., p′i(y1, . . . , ym) ⇔ succpi ,a(y1, . . . , ym) does not hold). From
the way we deﬁned RD this is never the case. The way we deﬁne pS ′i based on structure S always guarantees that
p′i(y1, . . . , ym) and succpi ,a(y1, . . . , ym) are equivalent. This contradicts our assumption. Thus, we get |	S ′′ ξ . Therefore |	S ′′
CnP ′ (ξ). Since the language of CnP ′ (ξ) is L(P ′), the restriction of S ′′ to L(P ′) (we refer to it as S ′′′) also models CnP ′ (ξ).
If we replace symbols in P ′ by their corresponding symbols in P , S ′′′ would be equal to S ′ . Therefore, |	S ′ Filter[a](ψ).
A.2. Proof of Corollary 8
We show that the two sets of structures have the same elements. By Theorem 7 we know that the left-hand side of the
equality is contained in the right-hand side.
Filter[a]({S | |	S ψ})⊆ {S ′ ∣∣ |	S ′ Filter[a](ψ)}
For the opposite direction (showing the right-hand side is contained in the left-hand side), suppose that we can encode the
left-hand side with a ﬁrst-order formula ϕ . Formula ϕ holds in all the members of the left-hand side. To prove the opposite
direction we need to show that,
Filter[a](ψ) |	 ϕ
Every model of Filter[a](ψ) (right-hand side of equation) is also a model of ϕ (left-hand side of the equation). In other
words, right-hand side is a subset of left-hand side.
To prove this statement we use the following lemma:
Lemma 22. Let ϕ′ be the formula computed by replacing every predicate p(y1, . . . , ym) in ϕ with succp,a(y1, . . . , ym). We prove
that:
ψ ∧ preconda |	 ϕ′
Proof. See Section A.3. 
We know that ϕ′ = ϕ[pi(y1,...,ym)/succpi ,a(y1,...,ym)] and we use this lemma ψ ∧ preconda |	 ϕ′ . Therefore,
ψ ∧ preconda ∧
∧
i
∀y1 . . .∀ym p′i(y1, . . . , ym) ⇔ succpi ,a(y1, . . . , ym)∧
∧
i
∀y1 . . .∀ym∀z f ′i = z ⇔
succ fi ,a(z) |	 ϕ[P/P ′]
and the proof is done (Filter[a](ψ) |	 ϕ).
A.3. Proof of Lemma 22
By contradiction assume that this is not the case. There is a structure S which |	S ψ ∧ preconda but S is not a model
of ϕ′ . Since |	S ψ and |	S preconda , observing the way RD is deﬁned, there should be an S ′ such that 〈S,a, S ′〉 ∈ RD and
S ′ ∈ Filter[a]({S | |	S ψ}). We encode Filter[a]({S | |	S ψ}) with formula ϕ . So |	S ′ ϕ .
Since we have replaced every predicate p in ϕ with succp,a for getting ϕ′ , with |	S ′ ϕ and 〈S,a, S ′〉 ∈ RD we conclude
that |	S ϕ′ . This contradicts our assumption.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 10: Progression possibility
We want to prove:
Dg ∪ Ds2 |	 ψ iff Dg ∪ Ds0 |	 ψ
Proving the forward direction is easy. We assume that Dg ∪ Ds2 |	 ψ and we prove that Dg ∪ Ds0 |	 ψ . By deﬁnition:
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Ds1 = Cns1(Dss0,1 ∪ Dap0,1 ∪ Ds0)
Therefore, Dg ∪ Dss1,2 ∪ Dap1,2 ∪ Ds1 |	 ψ (consequence ﬁnding procedure is sound). Now, we replace Ds1 by its deﬁnition.
We conclude that
Dg ∪ Dss1,2 ∪ Dap1,2 ∪ Dss0,1 ∪ Dap0,1 ∪ Ds0 |	 ψ
and since Dsst−1,t and Dapt−1,t are part of Dg , we can conclude that Dg ∪ Ds0 |	 ψ .
For the opposite direction, we should show that for a formula ψ uniform in do(a2,do(a1, s0)) if Dg ∪ Ds0 |	 ψ , then
Dg ∪ Ds2 |	 ψ . We can rewrite Dg as in the next formula.
Dg ∪ Ds0 |	 ψ
Dg ∪ Dss0,1 ∪ Dap0,1 ∪ Dss1,2 ∪ Dap1,2 ∪ Ds0 |	 ψ
From deduction theorem
Dss0,1 ∪ Dap0,1 ∪ Ds0 |	 (Dg ∧ Dss1,2 ∧ Dap1,2) ⇒ ψ
We use the following lemma:
Lemma 23. Let ϕ and ψ be two ﬁrst-order formulas, and f (T ) be a ground function in L(ϕ)∪L(ψ). Let ϕ[ f (T ):R] be the formula that
is obtained after replacing every ∀x φ where f (x) is in φ with (∀x (x = T ) ⇒ φ) ∧ φ[x/T ] and also replacing every instance of f (T )
with R. Then ϕ |	 ψ if and only if ϕ[ f (T ):R] |	 ψ[ f (T ):R] where R is a new constant symbol.
Using the lemma, we replace do(a1, s0) with s1 and do(a2, s1) with s2 in the above equation (note that a1, a2, s0, s1, and
s2 are constants). After this replacement, the intersection of the language of the two sides of |	 does not include s0, s2, and
function do.
Now, by applying Craig’s interpolation theorem for FOL, we get that there should be a ϕ in L(Dss0,1 ∪ Dap0,1 ∪ Ds0 ) ∩
L((Dg ∧ Dss1,2 ∧ Dap1,2 ) ⇒ ψ) such that
Dss0,1 ∪ Dap0,1 ∪ Ds0 |	 ϕ
ϕ |	 (Dg ∧ Dss1,2 ∧ Dap1,2) ⇒ ψ
Next, we replace back s1 and s2 with do(a1, s0) and do(a2,do(a1, s0)), respectively (using the result of the previous lemma,
we know that this replacement does not affect the entailment). Since ϕ does not include any term of sort situation except
do(a1, s0), it is uniform in do(a1, s0). From our deﬁnition of Ds1 we infer that ϕ ∈ Ds1 . Therefore
Ds1 |	 (Dg ∧ Dss1,2 ∧ Dap1,2) ⇒ ψ
Dss1,2 ∪ Dap1,2 ∪ Ds1 |	 Dg ⇒ ψ
With the same argument as before we can prove that
Ds2 |	 Dg ⇒ ψ
and the opposite direction is done.
A.5. Proof of Lemma 23
By contradiction assume that ϕ |	 ψ but ϕ[ f (T ):R] |	 ψ[ f (T ):R] . There is a structure M which |	M ϕ[ f (T )|R] but M is not a
model of ψ[ f (T )|R] . Deﬁne M ′ equal to M except that f (T )M
′ = RM and also M ′ does not have constant symbol R . With the
deﬁnition of M ′ , it is clear that |	M′ ϕ . Given our assumption |	M′ ψ .
We deﬁne M ′′ equal to M ′ except that it has a new constant symbol R for which RM′′ = f (T )M′ . We can conclude that
this new M ′′ is a model of ψ[ f (T ):R] . M ′′ and M differ only in the interpretation of f (T ), and ψ[ f (T ):R] does not have any
evaluation of f (T ). Therefore, |	M ψ[ f (T )|R] .
The other direction is proved similarly.
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The proof for the ﬁrst three parts is similar to the proof given by [3] for propositional ﬁltering. We use the result stated
by Corollary 8 in our proof.
(1) Take a structure S ′ that satisﬁes Filter[a](ϕ∨ψ). Then, there is a structure S that satisﬁes ϕ∨ψ such that RD(S,a, S ′).
Thus, S satisﬁes one of ϕ or ψ because S is a complete setting of the ﬂuents. Therefore, S ′ is in one of Filter[a](ϕ) or
Filter[a](ψ). It follows that Filter[a](ϕ ∨ψ) ⇒ Filter[a](ϕ)∨ Filter[a](ψ).
For the other direction take S ′ that satisﬁes Filter[a](ϕ)∨ Filter[a](ψ). Then, it satisﬁes one of Filter[a](ϕ) or Filter[a](ψ).
Thus, there is a structure S such that RD(S,a, S ′) and S satisﬁes one of ϕ or ψ . Thus, S satisﬁes ϕ ∨ψ and S ′ satisﬁes
Filter[a](ϕ ∨ψ). It follows that Filter[a](ϕ ∨ψ) ⇐ Filter[a](ϕ)∨ Filter[a](ψ).
(2) Take a structure S ′ that satisﬁes Filter[a](ϕ∧ψ). Then, there is a structure S that satisﬁes ϕ∧ψ such that RD(S,a, S ′).
Thus, S satisﬁes both of ϕ and ψ . Thus, S ′ is in both of Filter[a](ϕ) and Filter[a](ψ). We conclude that every S ′ that
satisﬁes Filter[a](ϕ ∧ψ) also satisﬁes Filter[a](ϕ)∧ Filter[a](ψ). It follows |	 Filter[a](ϕ ∧ψ) ⇒ Filter[a](ϕ)∧ Filter[a](ψ).
(3) Take S ′ that satisﬁes ¬Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](TRUE). Then, there is no structure S that RD(S,a, S ′) and S satisﬁes ϕ .
Thus, for every structure S that RD(S,a, S ′), S satisﬁes ¬ϕ . Since S ′ satisﬁes Filter[a](TRUE) there is a structure S
such that RD(S,a, S ′). This S satisﬁes ¬ϕ so S ′ satisﬁes Filter[a](¬ϕ). It follows that |	 Filter[a](¬ϕ) ⇐ ¬Filter[a](ϕ) ∧
Filter[a](TRUE).
(4) We used Skolemization for this part. We show that the two sets of world structures are equal. We ﬁrst show that the
left-hand side of the equation is contained in the right-hand side.
Filter[a](∃x ϕ(x))≡ ∃x Filter[a](ϕ(L))[L/x]
Take structure M such that |	M F ilter[a](∃x ϕ(x)). We show that |	M ∃x Filter[a](ϕ(L))[L/x] .
Based on Theorem 7:
|	M Filter[a](∃x ϕ(x)) iff M ∈ Filter[a]
({
S
∣∣ |	S ∃x ϕ(x))}
Based on Deﬁnition 6:
M ∈ {S ′ ∣∣ |	S ∃x ϕ(x), 〈S,a, S ′〉 ∈ RD}
Based on Deﬁnition 5, there exists an S that:
|	S ∃x ϕ(x)
|	S preconda
|S| = |M|
pM = {〈v1, . . . , vm〉 ∣∣ |	S succp,a(v1, . . . , vm)}
f M = {〈v1, . . . , vr〉 ∣∣ |	S succ f ,a(v1, . . . , vr)}
We deﬁne SL,ϕ equal to S with additional mapping of new constant symbol L to v ∈ |S| such that |	S ϕ(v). In this
case:
|	SL,ϕ ϕ(L)
We can progress SL,ϕ with action a.
M ′ ∈ Filter[a]({SL,ϕ}) iff∣∣M ′∣∣= |SL,ϕ |
pM
′ = {〈v1, . . . , vm〉 ∣∣ |	SL,ϕ succp,a(v1, . . . , vm)}
f M
′ = {〈v1, . . . , vr〉 ∣∣ |	SL,ϕ succ f ,a(v1, . . . , vr)}
We conclude that |	M′ F ilter[a](ϕ(L)).
Deﬁne DL equal to D with an extra constant symbol L. We can say that M is the restriction of M ′ to symbols in D
because it behaves like M ′ on every element in the domain except that it does not have the symbol L.
We can use the following lemma to complete the proof.
Lemma 24. Take ψ ∈ L(DL), we can prove that:
|	M ∃x ψ[L/x] iff ∃M ′ |	M ′ ψ such that M is a restriction of M ′ to L(ψ)\{L}
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With this lemma the proof is complete. The other side is the same. All conclusions are if and only if so the other side is
also proved.
A.7. Proof of Lemma 24
Suppose that the left-hand side is true but the right-hand side is not.
|	M ∃x ψ[X/x] iff ∃M ′ |	M ′ ψ such that M is a restriction of M ′ to L(ψ)\{L}
It means there is no structure M ′ that models ψ and M is a restriction of M ′ . Assume that v ∈ |M| is the x that makes
the existential quantiﬁer true. Add a constant X to M such that X = v and call this new structure M ′′ . |	M′′ ψ and M is a
restriction of M ′′ to L(ψ)\{X}. We can conclude that the left-hand side implies the right-hand side.
Now for the other side, suppose that the right-hand side is true but the left-hand side is not. The element in the domain
associated with X would satisfy the existential quantiﬁer and the proof is done.
A.8. Proof of Theorem 13
Theorem 11 supplies the proof of 1, the “⇒” direction of 2, the “⇐” direction of 3, and the proof of 4.
We are left to prove the “⇐” direction of 2 and the “⇒” direction of 3 (similar to propositional case in [3]).
For “⇐” of 2, let S ′ be a structure that satisﬁes Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](ψ). Then, it satisﬁes both of Filter[a](ϕ) and
Filter[a](ψ). For Filter[a](ϕ) there is a structure S such that RD(S,a, S ′) and S satisﬁes ϕ . Similarly, for Filter[a](ψ) there
is a structure S1 such that RD(S1,a, S ′) and S1 satisﬁes ψ . However, since a acts as a one-to-one mapping between
structures, there is only one structure that maps to S ′ . Thus, S = S1, and S satisﬁes ψ . S satisﬁes ϕ ∧ ψ and S ′ satisﬁes
Filter[a](ϕ ∧ψ). It follows that |	 Filter[a](ϕ ∧ψ) ⇐ Filter[a](ϕ)∧ Filter[a](ψ).
For “⇒” of 3, let S ′ be a structure that satisﬁes Filter[a](¬ϕ). Then, there is a structure S that satisﬁes ¬ϕ such that
RD(S,a, S ′). Thus, S does not satisﬁes ϕ . Since a acts as a one-to-one mapping, there is only one structure that maps to
S ′ after a. There is no structure S1 that satisﬁes ϕ and for which RD(S1,a, S ′). So, S ′ does not satisfy Filter[a](ϕ) and
therefore it satisﬁes ¬Filter[a](ϕ). Clearly, S ′ also satisﬁes Filter[a](TRUE). So S ′ satisﬁes ¬Filter[a](ϕ) ∧ Filter[a](TRUE). It
follows that |	 Filter[a](¬ϕ) ⇒ ¬Filter[a](ϕ)∧ Filter[a](TRUE).
A.9. Proof of Theorem 14
By Theorem 13, we know that algorithm FF is correct. It decomposes ψ ∧ preconda into atomic sub-formulas by using
distribution properties. Since we assume that we have the ﬁltering of atomic formulas (as a precomputed table) we just
retrieve it in time F and combine the results. Therefore, the time complexity of this algorithm is O (|ψ ∧ preconda| × F ).
A.10. Proof of Theorem 17
Using formula 1 we should show that every clause in formula 1 is also in the set of 7 and every Φ in 7 is a consequence
of formula 1. We repeat formula 1 here.
1. Filter[a](ψ) =
(
CnP
′
(
ψ ∧ preconda
∧
i
∀y1, . . . , ym, p′i(y1, . . . , ym) ⇔ succpi ,a(y1, . . . , ym)
∧
i
∀z, f ′i = z ⇔ succ fi ,a(z)
))
[P ′/P]
2. Filter[o](ψ) = ψ ∧ o
Suppose that Φ(p′1, . . . , p′n) is a consequence of formula 1 before applying [P ′/P]. We want to show that ψ ∧ preconda |	
Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a). By the above deﬁnition
ψ ∧ preconda ∧
∧
i
∀y1 . . .∀ymp′i(y1, . . . , ym) ⇔ succpi ,a(y1, . . . , ym)
∧
i
∀z, f ′i = z ⇔ succ fi ,a(z) |	 Φ
(
p′1, . . . , p′n
)
We refer to left-hand side as ξ . Therefore, for every structure M , if |	M ξ then |	M Φ(p′1, . . . , p′n) and since the value of
every p′i is equivalent to succpi ,a in M , we conclude that |	M Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a). As a result,
ξ |	 Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a)
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consists of some equivalence formulas about p′i). One direction of the proof is done.
Now for the other direction, we show that for every Φ(p1, . . . , pn) in the set of 7, ξ |	 Φ(p′1, . . . , p′n). Since
ψ ∧ preconda |	 Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a), this part is also trivial.
A.11. Proof of Theorem 19
Correctness. To prove that the algorithm UCF returns the ﬁltering of ψ correctly we use the result of Theorem 17. We
want to ﬁnd all Φ(p1, . . . , pn)s such that ψ ∧ preconda |	 Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a).
The algorithm Filter-True ﬁnds all Φs that true |	 Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a). In other words, Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a)
should be a tautology. Since all φps are unit clauses, the size of tautologies is at most 2. The algorithm checks the uniﬁability
of every pair of φp and φp′ and ﬁnds all the tautologies of size 2.
Next, we need to ﬁnd all Φs that ψ ∧preconda |	 Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a). With Theorem 13 we divide ψ ∧preconda into
atomic formulas. Let q be an atomic formula, we want to ﬁnd all Φs that q |	 Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a). We rewrite it as
true |	 ¬q ∨Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a)
Therefore, ¬q ∨Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a) should be a tautology. (6) of UCStep ﬁnds all such Φs.
Complexity. Suppose that we have t successor state axioms and we divide them into k instantiated successor state axioms
of the form
Poss
(
A(x1, . . . , xn), s
) ⇒ (condp ⇒ (pp(z1, . . . , zm,do(a, s)) ⇔ φp(z1, . . . , zm+n, s)))
where l = l1 + 1+ · · · + lt + 1. The ﬁrst successor state axiom after breaking into instantiated successor state axioms results
in l1 + 1 new axioms. We can easily verify that the size of the ﬁrst l1 axioms is 2 and the size of l1 + 1th axiom is O (Rl1).
Therefore, the total size of all instantiated successor state axioms is 2l1 + Rl1 + · · · + 2lt + Rlt which is O (Rl).
Since we have |ψ ∧preconda| atomic formulas and for every atomic formula the size of the resulted formula after ﬁltering
is less than the size of all successor state axioms, the size of the returned formula would be O (Rl|ψ ∧preconda|). In addition
there is a constant formula (ﬁltering of TRUE) that we add to the resulted formula. Suppose that the size of the instantiated
successor state axioms are x1, . . . , xl . The size of ﬁltering of TRUE would be less than ΣiΣ j(xi + x j) = Σi(lxi + Σ j x j) =
O (Rl2). The size of the formula is O (Rl2 + Rl|ψ ∧ preconda|).
For computing the time complexity, we run Filter-True once which takes O (l2) and we run UCStep once for each single
literal and it takes O (l) each time. Therefore, the time complexity is the same as the space complexity O (Rl2 + Rl|ψ ∧
preconda|).
A.12. Proof of Theorem 20
Correctness. To prove that the algorithm FOSF returns the ﬁltering of ψ correctly we use the result of Theorem 17. We
want to ﬁnd all Φ(p1, . . . , pn)s such that ψ ∧ preconda |	 Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a).
FO-STRIPS-Step ﬁnds some Φs that ψ ∧ preconda |	 Φ(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a) by using resolution (since all φps are either
TRUE, FALSE, or the same literal). We refer to the set of Φs that this part returns as ξ .
We need to show that if ψ ∧ preconda |	 c′(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a) where c′ is a clause, then a clause in ξ subsumes
c′(p1, . . . , pn).
c′(succp1,a, . . . , succpn,a) = t1 ∨ · · · ∨ tm
ti cannot be TRUE or FALSE otherwise it would be subsumed by the last two terms of (14) in FO-STRIPS-Step. ti cannot be
in Eff(a) and since the resolution is complete c′ should be computed by (11).
Complexity. Suppose that the length of the belief state formula is |ψ |. The ﬁrst two lines (recursive calls) of the algorithm
take O (|ψ |) time. Splitting into pure literal clauses takes O (|E| + |ψ |) time because the size of the resulted formula is
|E| + |S| and |S| |ψ | (a clause in the original belief state is either broken into multiple clauses, in which case the number
of ones added to E is more than the number of ones added to S , or is not broken and is added directly to E or S and the
number of such clauses is less than |ψ |).
After splitting into cases, every literal that is an instance of a member of Eff(a) is resolved out from E . This process may
not terminate in general, but we assume in the theorem that cases leave no variable uninstantiated. This reduces resolution
over those variables to propositional resolution, which is guaranteed to terminate. More speciﬁcally, there are at most l
different literals that are instantiated this way, for every affected literal in Eff(a).
Thus, the size of E before resolution is  l · |ψ |. After resolution E ’s size increases to at most (l · |ψ |)2|Eff(a)| . The time
complexity of the resolution depends on the size of the resulting set, so the algorithm takes O ((l · |ψ |)2|Eff(a)|), and the
resulting belief state is of the same size.
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The number of different literals possible with m predicates of maximum arity R and C constants is bounded by 2m · (R+
C)R , for m predicates. Thus, the total number of 2-clauses possible with m predicates of arity at most R and C constants
(and unbounded number of variables) is bounded by (2m · (R + C)R)2. Since all clauses in the algorithm are 2-clauses, the
number of clauses maintained in the belief state at time t is of size O (m2 · (R + C)2R).
The time complexity follows from this bound on the size of the resulting formula and noticing that the majority of time
spent in the procedure is on resolution and deriving the resolvents in that bound.
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